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SHOULD LEGAL PRECEDENT BASED ON OLD, FLAWED, SCIENTIFIC ANALYSIS
REGARDING WHEN LIFE BEGINS, CONTINUE TO APPLY TO PARENTAL
DISPUTES OVER THE FATE OF FROZEN EMBRYOS, WHEN THERE ARE NOW
SCIENTIFICALLY KNOWN AND OBSERVED FACTS PROVING LIFE BEGINS AT
FERTILIZATION?
I. INTRODUCTION
The author submits that previous court decisions about the fate of stored embryos are
flawed because they are not based on the current observable scientific facts of the behavior and
composition of the human embryo, which has been scientifically identified as a human organism
and an identifiable member of the same species of those who decide his or her fate.
Scientists now have films of early human embryo development revealing the behavior and
composition of the embryo: from the time before the maternal and paternal pronuclei move to the
center of the one cell human embryo, known as a zygote; through the time the chromosomes line
up on a cleavage spindle to replicate the chromosomes in the next cell; through the development
of each subsequent cell in the embryo; and, through the blastocyst stage of development, when the
embryo contains the pluripotent cells, on which some scientists wish to do research.1 At the

Ronan O’Rahilly & Fabiola Muller, Human Embryology & Teratology, NEW YORK: WILEYLISS at 89 (1996). See also Stem Cell Key Terms, CAL. INST. FOR REGENERATIVE MED.,
https://www.cirm.ca.gov/patients/stem-cell-key-terms (last visited May 7, 2018). Pluripotent
cells can become any cell in the human body compared to totipotent cells that give rise to
placenta cells and human body cells. Pluripotent: Stem Cell Information – Glossary, NAT’L INST.
OF HEALTH – DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV.,
https://stemcells.nih.gov/glossary.htm#pluripotent (last visited May 14, 2018). Pluripotent cells
cannot sustain full organismal development. Totipotent cells by division create the whole
organism. Totipotent: Stem Cell Information – Glossary, NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH – DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., https://stemcells.nih.gov/glossary.htm#totipotent (last visited May 14,
2018).
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blastocyst stage of development, the inner cell mass, not the placental cells, but the stem cells
which make the human body, are more easily seen in the embryo, and there is a difference between
mere cells in the embryo and the embryos who are human organisms, human beings, and that
biological difference can affect legal determinations that differentiate between human stem cells
and human embryos.2
Observable facts of human development can be seen in films of one cell human embryos
that were cryopreserved in a period of years before 2002, filmed in 2008, and reported in
scientific journals and lectures after 2010.3 Misconceptions in previous court precedent that
embryos in storage were mere undifferentiated cells or reproductive tissue, misled subsequent
courts to resolve embryo disposition disputes by: (a) incorrectly framing the issue as one of
division of marital property; (b) invoking a parents’ so-called, but non-existent, “right not to
procreate;” (c) ignoring the embryos' own interest in continued life; and (d) discounting the
parents' constitutional rights to familial association with, and desire to care for and protect, their
procreated child-in-being.
By recognizing that human embryos are human beings, courts are faced with parental
disputes over the fate of created embryos to: (a) recognize that in deciding the disposition of
human embryos they are determining the custody and fate of human beings, not marital property;
(b) reject the so-called “right not to procreate” as inapplicable, because in the case of
cryopreserved or vitrified embryos purposeful procreation has already occurred; (c) evaluate
contracts that describe embryos as mere property as invalid, under known scientific fact, refuse
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to allow contract law to condemn human life, and only consider actual advance directives
concerning the embryos, in light of the embryos' best interests, and include the best interests of
the embryos in the calculus leading to a disposition decision; and (d) consider as well the parents'
constitutional rights and desire to bear, care for, and protect their unborn child(ren).
This article reports on the scientific facts observed about embryonic development, and
particularly human embryonic development, subsequent to the decision of Roe v. Wade,4 wherein
the Court stated that it did not know when life began, and the 1992 seminal case of Davis v. Davis,5
wherein the Tennessee Supreme Court in dicta, reviewed the scientific evidence on the nature of
the human embryo and adopted a legal status of “special respect,” a status between personhood
and property to be given to the human “pre-embryo.”6 This article discusses the progeny of
embryo cases since Davis, and questions whether legal precedent will continue to fail to take
judicial notice of the human status of the human embryo.
Among the symbolic sculptures at the exit of the United States Supreme Court is a statue
of a turtle which signifies that the law is slow to change. Now, forty-four years after Roe v. Wade,
it is the time to re-examine scientific facts of human development based on the current scientific
knowledge and allow the turtle of law to move to the point of recognizing that the law should
protect human beings equally whether in vitro (in glass) or (in vivo in a uterus). In both cases the
law must realize that it is dealing with human beings.
THE SCIENCE
II. SCIENTISTS KNOW THAT HUMAN LIFE BEGINS AT FERTILZATION AND THE
NATURE OF THE CREATION.
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The question of when human life begins is no longer a mystery, but an observable fact and
the data of human development is collected and reported on internet references, such as the Virtual
Human Embryo (VHE), a 14,250-page illustrated atlas of human embryology, which describes the
twenty-three stages of observations in human development called the Carnegie Stages. 7 The
Carnegie Stages are named for a U.S. Institute which began collecting and classifying embryos
based on external or internal morphological features to standardize twenty-three stages of human
development.8 Through the VHE, databases of film, research data, and explanation of scientific
terms and source material are available for each of the Carnegie twenty-three stages of Human
Development.
The opinion in Roe was made before the use of in vitro fertilization procedures, to conceive
human individuals such as Louise Brown, born July 25, 1978. In the last forty-four years since
Roe, scientists have been able to use time lapse photography to observe the development of human
embryos.9
Renee Reijo Pera, Ph.D., former professor of Obstetrics and Gynecology at Stanford
Medical School and former Director of the Center for Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research at
Stanford’s Institute for Stem Cell Biology and Reproductive Medicine, (who is now at Montana
State University as Vice President for Research Creativity and Technology Transfer), studied and

7

The Virtual Human Embryo, THE ENDOWMENT FOR HUMAN DEV.,
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recorded in 2008, the early development of one-hundred out of two-hundred-forty-two one cell
human embryos created prior to 2002.10
The embryos had been preserved in a frozen state from a one cell or zygote stage of
development twelve to eighteen hours after fertilization.11 The scientists filmed the embryos with
time-lapse video microscopy until the embryos had developed many cells in a hollow sphere ball
shape called a blastocyst as seen in Blastocyst Day 3-6 Movie.12 The study found that cells within
the early human embryo developed on a self-determined schedule (first 1, then 2, then 3, then 4,
then 5, then 6, etc.,) and not in synchrony (not 2, 4, 6, 8, or 8 become 16 at the same time).13 Each
cell was making autonomous decisions.14 Embryonic genes to develop the body were active in the
embryo at the eighth-cell stage.15 At the eighth-cell stage, not all cells expressed embryonic
genes.16 These scientific facts support the conclusion that the early embryo cells perform different
tasks such as in gene expression, and yet work in an integrated, coordinated organismic program
to reveal the body plan and supportive structures. They behave not as a cell aggregate, or mere
tissue, but function as a developing human being with the cells working in an organized manner
for the good of the organism’s growth and development, not simply for the good of the individual
cell.
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Similarly, other scientists, such as Nobel Prize recipient, Robert Edwards, who helped
create the first human baby born from IVF procedures, Louise Brown, published his findings about
the differences found in the cells of the early embryo.17
Two of the cells in a four-cell embryo will often develop into the inner cell mass that has
a role to play in body development.18

Another cell develops into the trophectoderm (the

trophectoderm includes the placenta).19 The fourth cell of the four-cell stage will often develop
into the germline, which will also play a role in human development. 20 Even at the fourth-cell
stage, protein distributions in each cell can be different.21 For example, the fourth cell with mostly
vegetal cytoplasm has small amounts of proteins leptin and STAT 3, whereas two cells have
intermediate amounts and a third cell with mostly animal cytoplasm has large amounts. 22 In
addition, mRNA expression of proteins such as B-HCG secretions are different in trophectoderm
cells as compared to cells that will reveal the inner cell mass.23
Scientist, Dr. Maureen Condic, who holds a doctorate in neurobiology from the
University of California, Berkeley, and currently teaches human embryology as an Associate
Professor of Neurobiology and Anatomy at the University of Utah School of Medicine, confirms,
based on accepted scientific criteria, that human life begins at fertilization. Dr. Condic reports
scientists determine when a new cell is formed based on two universal criteria, cell composition
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and cell behavior.24 When sperm and egg plasma fuse in less than a second, a single cell is
created that has a composition consisting of a gene set or genome that can be distinguished from
the gene set of the sperm or the gene set of the egg. The new cell has sperm and egg derived
components, but the molecular composition is unique.25 The new cell immediately acts
differently than either gamete and prepares to replicate.26 The new cell acts not as a mere human
cell, but as an organism undergoing a self-directed process of maturation.27 Dr. Condic has
given expert testimony to the same effect: “Thus the conclusion that a human zygote is a human
being (i.e. a human organism) is not a matter of religious belief, societal convention or emotional
reaction. It is a matter of observable, objective fact.”28
Other scientists confirm Dr. Condic's statements. Dr. Renee Reijo Pera, Ph.D., the Vice
President of Research and Economic Development at Montana State University and former
Professor of Obstetrics and Gynecology and former Director of Stanford Center for Human
Pluripotent Stem Cell Research and Education, said in a 2010 lecture that she discovered in her
research that what makes us human “wasn't consciousness, and it wasn't love, and it wasn't
spirituality, but it just is: on day one, a human sperm and a human egg come together and we
have a human embryo.”29
The scientific conclusion that human life begins at fertilization arises from scientists'
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Remanded by Planned Parenthood of Ind., Inc. v. Comm’r of the Ind. State Department of
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IdeaCity, Renee Reijo Pera – Synthetic Human Reproduction, YOUTUBE (Sep. 1, 2010),
https://youtube/mkHhTT5Qqsg.
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observation of early embryonic development. Dr. Condic's 2014 paper relied upon over onehundred scientific research papers from 1995 onward describing and analyzing twenty-six
separate developmental changes in the early embryo from sperm-egg binding through days four
through six.30 Her paper establishes that from the time of fertilization as a one-cell zygote, an
embryo is not a mere collection or aggregate of cells, but an internally directed, dynamic
organism.
Dr. Condic’s paper points to confusing terminology describing the observable facts as
causing disagreement over when life begins. According to Dr. Condic, the word “zygote”
properly describes the youngest (one-cell) embryo,31 yet, the Carnegie Stages of Early
Embryonic Development, which employs twenty-three stages to describe human development in
the first fifty-six days of life, uses “zygote” to describe the embryo only at the end of stage one
(which has phases a, b and c), while using the term “penetrated oocyte” (oocyte is an egg) to
refer to the embryo before phase one-c.32 According to Dr. Condic, this “pre-zygote error”
(labeling a human embryo a “penetrated oocyte” before it develops into a “zygote”) ignores that
immediately, i.e., within a quarter of a second after fertilization, the embryo’s cell composition
and behavior -- the two principal characteristics determining cell classification -- change markedly
from those of the sperm and oocyte individually.33 Dr. Condic explains:
Modern scientific evidence demonstrates that the one-cell human embryo or
zygote, is formed at the instant of sperm-egg plasma membrane fusion. The zygote
has unique material composition that is distinct from either gamete. It immediately
initiates a series of cellular and biochemical events that ultimately generate the
cells, tissues and structures of the mature body in an orderly temporal and spatial
30

Condic, supra note 24, at 49-67.
Id. at 47.
32
Id. at 68-69. See O’Rahilly, supra note 1, at 89. See also Developmental Anatomy, NAT’L
MUSEUM OF HEALTH & MED.,
http://www.medicalmuseum.mil/index.cfm?p=collections.hdac.anatomy.s01.
33
Condic, supra note 24, at 44, 47, 68-69, 79.
31
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sequence. The capacity to undergo development is a defining characteristic of a
human organism at the beginning of life. The scientific evidence presented here
refutes the long standing “pre-zygote error” promoted by the Carnegie stages that
the zygote is not formed until syngamy, and therefore, the cell produced by the
fusion of the gametes is nothing more than a “penetrated oocyte.” Ethical positions
that deny the personhood of a human being at all stages of life are logically
inconsistent and scientifically unsound, in addition to having significant, negative
implications for the ethical treatment of all human persons.34
According to Dr. Condic, a human embryo from the very start is markedly different from
other human cells. While human cells sustain their cellular life through complex behaviors, they
do not have a higher level of organization transcending their cells.35 A human embryo, even as a
single cell, is an organism, directing development first as a single cell, then in groups of
interacting cells, tissues and structures, all in a specific spatial and temporal sequence.36 This
process continues throughout the organism's life, ending only with its demise. Cryostorage
slows down the embryos' growth and metabolism, but they are still living human beings.
Dr. Condic explains the differences between an organism and an aggregate of cells, such
as tissues or organs. While an aggregate of cells, “are alive and carry on the activities of cellular
life, yet [they] fail to exhibit coordinated interactions directed towards any higher-level
organization.”37 By contrast, an organism exhibits that “higher level” of organization, acting “in
an interdependent and coordinated manner to ‘carry on the activities of life.’”38 An organism is
34

Id. at 47-48, 75.
Id. at 48. HeLa cells are an example of cell aggregates that are not human organisms but can
grow and multiply. See Sarah Zielinski, Cracking the Code of the Human Genome/ Henrietta
Lack’s ‘Immortal’ Cells, SMITHSONIAN MAGAZINE (Jan. 22, 2010),
http://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/henrietta-lacks-immortal-cells-6421299/?no-ist.
36
Condic, supra note 24, at 48.
37
Maureen L. Condic, When Does Human Life Begin? A Scientific Perspective, 1 THE
WESTCHESTER INST. FOR ETHICS & THE HUM. PERSON WHITE PAPER 1, 6 (2008).
38
Id. Condic notes that the word “organism” is defined by the NIH medical dictionary as “(1) a
complex structure of interdependent and subordinate elements whose relations and properties are
largely determined by their function in the whole and (2) an individual constituted to carry on the
activities of life by means of organs separate in function but mutually dependent: a living
being.” Id. at n.22.
35
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distinguished by the interaction of its parts “in the context of a coordinated whole.”39 Cells and
organs are parts of an organism; the organism is the whole, directing the parts from the moment
of fertilization. Condic elaborates on the organismic functioning of the zygote as follows:
From the moment of sperm-egg fusion, a human zygote acts as a complete whole,
with all the parts of the zygote interacting in an orchestrated fashion to generate the
structures and relationships required for the zygote to continue developing towards
its state....[t]he zygote acts immediately and decisively to initiate a program of
development that will, if uninterrupted by accident, disease, or external
intervention, proceed seamlessly through formation of the definitive body, birth,
childhood, adolescence, maturity, and aging, ending with death. This coordinated
behavior is the very hallmark of an organism.40
Condic concludes that the zygote, though only a single cell, “is not merely a unique
human cell, but a cell with all the properties of a fully complete (human organism). . . .”41 Each
of the scientific papers she cites in her 2014 paper (one-hundred-seventeen in all, dating from
1995 to 2013) document the fact that “the embryo does not function as a mere human cell or
group of human cells, it functions as an organism; a complete human being at an immature stage
of development.”42
In contrast to the research reported by Dr. Condic, in prior case law, the human embryos,
human beings in development, human lives with full potential to complete life’s cycle, are
improperly described as pre-embryos, pre-zygotes, cells, tissue, and property. A review of the
case law in this paper examines the scientific misunderstanding of the facts regarding behavior
and composition of the early developing human embryo in American embryo fate dispute case
precedent, compared to the factual observations made by modern science about the nature of the
early developing human embryo, and discusses the scientific understanding of the court as to the
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nature of the embryo in the resulting decision on the fate of the embryos at issue.
This article also addresses much of the legal precedent cited by courts and raised in amicus
briefs that opine on how to best resolve a dispute between parents about the fate of the embryos
they created. The author urges the courts with embryo fate disputes before them to apply the law
based on fact and not fiction, nor misconceived science from earlier case law that did not recognize
the human embryo as a human organism, and a member of the same species that seeks to terminate
or protect his or her future.
THE PRECEDENT
III. THE U.S. SUPREME COURT IN ROE v. WADE DECLINED TO ACKNOWLEDGE
WHEN HUMAN LIFE BEGAN AND INCORRECTLY CHARACTERIZED THE STATE
INTEREST AS AN INTEREST IN POTENTIAL HUMAN LIFE.
In Roe v. Wade, the U.S. Supreme Court said:
We need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins. When those trained
in the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable to
arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at this point in the development of man’s
knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as to the answer.43
Forty-three years later, scientists have determined with confidence the point at which a human
life begins, and, thus, have overcome the uncertainty confessed by the Roe court concerning “the
difficult question of when life begins.”44 Once procreation has occurred and human life has
begun, the rights and interests at issue can no longer be framed as procreative or reproductive
interests of the parents.

The rights and interests of the parents, the procreated human embryos,

and government’s interest in protecting or experimenting on human life, must all be identified and
weighed on the scales of justice.
Roe, in its 1973 opinion, also, reported “new embryological data that purport to indicate

43
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Roe, 410 U.S. at 160.
Id. at 159.
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that conception is a ‘process’ over time rather than an event . . . .”45 For the reasons discussed
above and below, current human embryology establishes that indeed while human development
is a process, lasting through the prenatal and postnatal life, it begins with a particular factually
observable event: fertilization. It is time for courts to recognize the facts that: (1) a new human
life is created at sperm-oocyte binding; (2) that the parents who contribute their sperm or oocyte
for the purpose of fertilization exercise their right to procreate at fertilization; (3) a zygote, a new
human being can be individually identified apart from any other human beings; and, (4) that the
newly created human being has full potential to complete the life cycle and direct his or her own
development until he or she dies.
IV. A CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN LEGAL PRECEDENT IN
ANALYZING THE FACTUAL EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO COURTS REGARDING
WHEN PROCREATION OCCURS, THE NATURE OF THE EMBRYO, AND THE
MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE SCIENTIFIC FACTS IN PRIOR CASES INVOLVING
DISPUTES OVER WHO HAS THE AUTHORITY TO DECIDE EMBRYONIC FATE.
A. IN 1978, A JURY CORRECTLY FOUND VALUE IN THE LOSS OF CONTENTS
OF A VIAL CONTAINING EGGS AND SPERM THAT WERE DELIBERTLY
DESTROYED AND THAT SUCH DESTRUCTION CAUSED THE MOTHER WHO
SOUGHT PARENTHOOD EMOTIONAL DISTRESS.
A married couple seeking infertility treatment at a university facility in New York had
provided eggs and sperm to be placed by health care providers in a vial in hopes of fertilization.46
An informed consent was signed for the sperm and egg to combine in-vitro, or fertilization in
glass, with the intent of an operation to place the embryo in the natural mother with no guarantee
of pregnancy.47 A doctor at the university facility, believing the acts of placing eggs and sperm
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Id. at 160.
Del Zio v. Presbyterian Hospital in New York, No. 74 Civ. 3588 (CES), 1978 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14450 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
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Robin Marantz Henig, ‘Pandora’s Baby,’ THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE (Mar. 28, 2004),
https://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/28/books/chapters/pandoras-baby.html?_r=1.
46
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in a vial to create a human being was unethical, removed the stopper from the vial, and, thus,
destroyed the “experiment.”48 The same week the case was tried, the first test tube baby was
born in England.49
At trial, the mother received a $50,000.00 verdict for emotional distress for her claim of
physical and emotional damages and the father received $3.00 for loss of consortium after the
destruction of their fertilized egg.50 At trial the jury rejected a property claim for the parents’
interest in the embryo.51
This case is an example of showing destruction of life, even before it was placed in the
womb, was recognized to have caused damage to a mother, and would not be the type of damage
that would be expected had mere cells or tissue been destroyed. Loss of the created life, without
even guarantee of birth, can profoundly affect the parent when that life is taken away.
B. IN VIRGINIA, AN IVF CLINIC WANTED TO KEEP CONTROL OF THE
EMBRYOS, BUT THE COURT FOUND PROGENITOR RIGHTS PREVAILED
OVER CLINIC RIGHTS IN YORK v. JONES.
The next reported case on who had rights to stored embryos, analyzed whether the clinic,
the Jones Institute, or the parents, York, had rights to the created “human pre-zygotes” that had
been created and stored at the Jones Institute pursuant to a cryopreservation agreement drafted by
the clinic.52 The agreement explained that cryopreserving the embryos would reduce the risk of
multiple births while “creating additional opportunities for initiation of a pregnancy with the
48

Robin Marantz Henig, The Lives They Lived; Second Best, THE NEW YORK TIMES
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transfer of concepti developed from thawed, frozen, pre-zygotes.”53 The fact the embryos were
labeled “human pre-zygotes” implies that the embryos were at a one cell developmental stage
before the maternal and paternal pro-nuclei moved to the center of the cell, and the chromosomes
had lined up at the center of the cell. The issue of whether the embryos were person or property
was not challenged and the agreement indicated in a divorce proceeding ownership would be
determined in a property settlement and released by court order.54 The court noted the agreement
was consistent with the American Fertility Society (AFS) in their ethical statement on in-vitro
fertilization, claiming gametes and concepti are property of the donors.55
The progenitors/parents wanted the embryos shipped in a dry freezer to an out of state
clinic, where the parents planned to have the embryos undergo implantation at a later date.56 The
court examined the clinic consent form and noted while it gave the parents decision-making
authority over the embryos, the form did not address whether the embryos could be taken from
the clinic. Since the form did not address that issue, then the parties were not limited by the
three options that they were to implement in the event they did not seek to have the embryos
transferred in hopes of a pregnancy initiated at the Jones Institute.57 The court held that the
clinic was essentially holding the embryos as a bailment and favored progenitor rights over clinic
rights and clinic forms, albeit by a property contract analysis based on a breach of contract claim
filed by the progenitors.58

53

Id. at 424.
Id.
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Id. Note later the AFS would change their position from referring the embryo as property to an
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Sterility at 34S-35S (1990), referenced in Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 596-97.
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57
Id. at 427.
58
Id.
54

14

This case is an example of wanting to promote a preference for parents and not clinics to
have the ultimate authority over the life they have created. While this case failed to recognize or
analyze the true nature of the embryo, it accepted the clinic definition of the embryo as property.
Later case law precedent would uphold clinic forms allowing a clinic to control the embryos fate
to prevail over parental rights.
C. THE SEMINAL CASE OF DAVIS v. DAVIS EXAMINED THE SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE OF WHEN HUMAN LIFE BEGINS IN DICTA. AT THE
TENNESSEE SUPREME COURT LEVEL, AFTER REJECTING THE TRIAL
COURT FINDING THAT HUMAN EMBRYOS ARE HUMAN BEINGS, THE
COURT RULED THAT IF THERE IS NO CONTRACT, THEN A RIGHT TO
PROCREATE SHOULD BE BALANCED AGAINST A RIGHT NOT TO
PROCREATE, IN RESOLVING DISPUTES ON THE DISPOSITION OF
STORED EMBRYOS, REFERENCING A LAW REVIEW ARTICLE BY JOHN
A. ROBERTSON, WHICH ARGUED THAT THE EMBRYO WAS
UNDIFFERENTIATED CELLS THAT WOULD FIRST BECOME PLACENTA
AND CORD.
Only one embryo custody dispute has been decided in which the trial court took evidence on
the issue of whether a human embryo is a human being and deserving of legal protection.59 The
trial court in Davis found that, on the evidence considered, the human embryos before it were
indeed human beings.60 The appellate court reversed, and the Tennessee Supreme Court decided
that the embryos occupied an intermediate status between person and property.61 But, its
decision was made without the benefit of any advocacy for the embryos' status as human beings,
as, by that time, the parties had abandoned any argument that the embryos were human beings.62
Therefore, the issue of the embryos' status as human beings was not properly before the Court
and its opinion regarding the embryo’s legal status was dicta. This legal precedent needs to be

59
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reconsidered in light of current scientific research, which, ironically, fully supports the expert
testimony offered in the trial court for the humanity of the human embryo.
The Tennessee Supreme Court in dicta claimed a “pre-embryo. . . is due greater respect
than any other human tissue [emphasis added] because of its potential to become a person and
because of its symbolic meaning for many people.”63 Nevertheless, “it should not be treated as a
person, because it has not yet developed the features of personhood, is not yet established
developmentally as individual, and may never realize its biologic potential.”64
In so doing, the Tennessee Supreme Court adopted the rationale of the American Fertility
Society in 1990 and granted a legal status of “special respect” for a human embryo in Tennessee
and did not recognize the human embryo as an already created being.65 The Tennessee Supreme
Court opined that the special respect status left the decision-making power as to the embryos’
fate with the progenitors, but if they could not agree then the constitutional rights of the parties to
procreate or not procreate had to be balanced.66
This lack of recognition that the human embryos were already biologically created human
organisms has led to an erroneous precedent that embryos fate can be decided by contracts
drafted by corporations and a claim that there is a right to procreate to be balanced against the
right not to procreate, when the scientific fact is that human embryos are human beings and have
already been procreated. In effect, what is balanced under this approach is a parent’s right to
terminate innocent unborn life living in a facility and not in a human womb, because the parent
wants to escape the duties and responsibilities of parenthood for the created life, versus the
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Id. at 596.
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Id. at 603.
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parent’s right to provide for the care for the innocent unborn life of their son or daughter to grow
and develop and to complete the cycle of life.67 A re-examination of the misconceived science
understood in 1990 by the Tennessee Supreme Court is warranted, as the misconception that
stored embryos are mere cells or tissue still exists.68
In rejecting Dr. LeJuene’s testimony that the embryo was a human being, the Tennessee
Supreme Court in Davis69 gave more weight to the testimony of Dr. Robertson, who served on
the American Fertility Society, Dr. King, who was the parents’ IVF physician, and the post-trial
American Fertility Society 1990s statement describing an embryo’s first cellular differentiation
relating to interaction with the mother at the time of implantation.70 The analysis was really
dicta, because, not only was there no advocacy in the briefs on personhood at the Tennessee
Supreme Court, it was dicta because the Court commented that the distinction was not
dispositive of the issues before it, but relevant as to whether research was permitted on the
embryo.71
The Tennessee Supreme Court’s opinion referenced Robertson’s article,72 which was
written subsequent to the trial court decision in Davis, and stated that “[c]learly the fertilized
egg, embryo and fetus are human and are living.”73 Robertson claimed the question is whether
embryos merit the moral protection accorded to clearly defined persons.74 Robertson believed
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Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).
McQueen v. Gadberry, 507 S.W.3d 127, n.4 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016); (referring to “pre-embryos
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not exist until implantation).
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Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 593-94.
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(1990). See also Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 597.
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there was a problem in determining the legal status of embryos in reconciling respect for human
life and personhood with competing concerns of bodily integrity and procreative choice.75
Robertson suggested when there was no agreement to govern the embryos fate that “[a]s long as
the party wishing to reproduce could create other embryos, the desire to avoid biologic offspring
should take priority over the desire to reproduce with the embryos in question.”76 This logic did
not recognize that reproduction already has occurred and lacked respect for the dignity of the
created human being.
Current reported scientific factual observations do not support Robertson’s 1990 claim in
the law review relied on by the Tennessee Supreme Court, that the embryo was not a created
being, and Robertson’s criticism that the trial judge in Davis ignored “the biological reality that
the early embryos, while genetically unique, consist of a few undifferentiated cells that will first
form the placenta before the embryo itself develops.”77 Robertson in 1990 did not acknowledge
each stored embryo had the body part plan and components that were already developing in an
orderly and temporal sequence in accord with the instructions written in the DNA of each human
embryo, and each was developing uniquely from the other stored embryos in accordance with his
or her own DNA instructions. Robertson recommended “that the party wishing to avoid
reproduction should prevail whenever the other party has a reasonable chance of becoming a
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Id. at 437.
Id. at 480.
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Id. at 482-83. See also Lori Andrews, The Legal Status of the Embryos, 32 LOYOLA L. REV.
357, 363-64 (1986). Andrews claimed “[m]oreover since embryos are undifferentiated cell
masses [emphasis added by the author] and do not resemble people, it is unlikely that actions
toward in vitro embryos will shape our actions towards new born children, comatose people,
elderly patients or other persons.” Andrews also reported that John Robertson’s viewpoint of a
human embryo was “a biological program that instructs a woman’s body.” Id. at n.2. The Davis
case also referenced Andrews, in a discussion about resolution along with other disposition
models in legal journals at the time. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at n.5.
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parent by other means.”78 The Tennessee Supreme Court's decision essentially adopted
Robertson's description of “biological reality” and his recommendation of a presumption in favor
of a parental decision to terminate what he believed were “undifferentiated cells that will first
form the placenta,” not recognizing that the cells were live human organisms with potential to
complete their life cycle.79 In 1990, Robertson did not acknowledge that the role of the gamete
providers was biologically completed in contributing to the makeup of the new created organism,
and the new human organism was viable when stored and would remain viable until death, so the
procreation was complete. The continued growth and development of the embryo would depend
on shelter in a womb prenatally and nourishment, just as all humans need appropriate shelter and
nourishment even during mature age, just as an astronaut in space or a serviceman in a
submarine.80
As discussed, Robertson’s and others description of early embryos as “consist[ing] of a
few undifferentiated cells,” is scientifically incorrect as the embryo is acting as a human
organism. Current scientific observations prove the opposite. Every cell in the embryo can have
different behaviors working towards revealing different parts of the body plan as the human
organism grows and develops.81
The Davis court's chief rationale and basis of the court opinion for denying the humanity
of the early embryo was the alleged “undifferentiated” nature in that the opinion stated:
Thus the first cellular differentiation of the new generation relates to the
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and Scientifically Based Analysis, 14 REGENT U. L. REV. 67, 85 (2001),
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Condic, supra note 24, at 58. See also Edwards, supra note 17, at 207.
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physiological interaction with the mother, rather than to the establishment of the
embryo itself. It is for this reason that it is appropriate to refer to the developing
entity up to this point as a preembryo rather than an embryo…82
Since the basis of denying the embryos humanity was based on the premise that the cells in the
embryo were not differentiating and the body parts of the embryo were not developing prior to
implantation in a womb, and that premise is contradicted by current scientific observation,83 the
courts should no longer accept or rely on Davis or its progeny to privilege a parent's desire to
terminate embryonic life over the opposing parent's desire to preserve it, or for denying an
embryo's rights as a full human being.84 Robertson’s lack of understanding in 1990 of what a
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Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 594; (citing the June 1990 American Fertility Society report on Ethical
Considerations in the New Technologies).
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Hollowell, supra note 80, at 90-92; (discussing how cloning is proof the development of the
embryo is separate from the mother who provides a nurturing environment).
84
The school of thought of not giving a “moral” status of personhood to a human organism
because “it has not yet developed the features of personhood, it is not yet established as
developmental individual, and it may never reach its biological potential” was the position of the
American Fertility Society in 1990, even though it had members that did not accept this school
of thought. Fertility and Sterility, Chapter 19: Status of the Conceptus, 81 AM. FERTILITY SOC’Y
47 (May 2004), https://www.fertstert.org/article/S0015-0282(04)00294-8/pdf?code=fns-site. The
report highlighted that the moral and legal status of the “developing human conceptus” was key
to accepting many procedures such as selection for transfer and discard of embryos with or
without preimplantation genetic diagnosis, experimentation, surrogacy and cryopreservation. The
report also stated:
Not the least of the problem is that the moral and legal status may differ from each
other in the minds of some individuals. For example, in the United States,
according to the Supreme Court decision of Roe v. Wade, personhood (i.e.,
protection by society) begins only with viability, but considerable (emphasis added
by author) opinion holds that pre-embryos should not be used for experimentation
because they are persons, or at least they require the respect of an individual who
is in being (i.e., a human being). Id.
Further, it reported that from the conducted survey, it did not intend the moral status to be related
to research, but the replies to the survey must be evaluated with that connection. Further, “[i]t
needs to be noted that the time limit for experimentation may or may not correspond to the
acquisition for personhood.” Id. Also, “[a]bout one half of the respondents indicated in their
reply to the questionnaire that personhood was considered to begin with fertilization.” Id. In
addition, “it was difficult to know whether the survey respondents were stating religious tradition
or legislative position.” Id.
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human organism is and how cells in the early embryo are communicating and directing the
behavior of the progeny cells to reveal all the cells in the body plan until they cease to exist
prenatally or postnatally, has been a basis for embryos to be treated as cells or tissues and
therefore, property subjects in dispute, instead of the frank presentation to decision makers, such
as courts, that in-vitro embryos like in-vivo embryos are created human beings, not mere
reproductive tissue, and human beings are the subjects at issue in embryo fate disputes.
When balancing party rights, Robertson acknowledges that the pleasures of parenthood
will be deeper and more intense than the discomfort of unwanted biological offspring, but
Robertson would only grant this pleasure to the parent that cannot “reproduce.”85 The problem
in the Robertson proposed balancing test of the right to procreate or not procreate or reproduce or
not reproduce, is that it fails to recognize that procreation has occurred and fails to afford the
dignity and respect due to protect the human rights of the already created human beings, with
DNA different from progenitor and sibling embryos.

Similarly, the American Society for Reproductive Medicine (ASRM) recognizes diversity
in its membership on whether an embryo has a “moral” status of a person. Ethics Committee of
the American Society for Reproductive Medicine, Donating embryos for human embryonic stem
cell (Hesc) research: A Committee Opinion, 100 FERTILITY & STERILITY 935 (2013),
https://www.asrm.org/news-and-publications/ethics-committee-documents/. ASRM recognized
diversity in viewpoints among its members and reported
…the embryo used in research, which ranges in development from a single cell to
hundreds cells has no nervous system and has a limited chance of developing to
birth. The possibility of twinning or regression to a nonviable entity up to the 14th
day after fertilization is consistent with the notion that the embryo lacks
individuality. Id.
The ASRM Ethics Committee regards the embryo as a “potential” human being worthy
of “special respect.” Id. Further, the committee claims, for good reason, the human embryo can
be subject to experimental research before the primitive streak appears around day fourteen of
development. Note that these international and national professional societies statement
published a “moral” value, that not all of their own members share, and is not a reflection on the
objective observable biologic fact that a human embryo is a developing human being.
85
Robertson, supra note 72, at 481.
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The Robertson approach promotes a culture having an affirmative right to terminate
innocent wanted human life hidden under the guise of a right not to procreate, while ignoring
that procreation has already occurred. According to Robertson, there is no loss of a right to
procreate when any future children can be created, so if one weighs a right to procreate against a
right not to procreate and one can still procreate, then the one opposing procreation always wins
the balancing contest.86
At the Davis trial, world-renowned human geneticist, Dr. Jerome LeJeune, in his expert
testimony equated conception with fertilization, saying “[e]ach human has a unique beginning
which occurs at the moment of conception.”87 He refuted the idea that there is a “subclass of the
embryo to be called a preembryo,” stating “there is nothing before the embryo; before an embryo
there is only a sperm and an egg . . . . When the first cell exists all the ‘tricks of the trade’ to
build itself into an individual already exists.”88
The trial court found Dr. LeJeune's testimony to be clear and unrebutted, and concluded,
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Id. at 480.
Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 641, at *14 (Ct. App. Sep. 21, 1989).
Dr. LeJeune’s use of “conception” for fertilization or sperm-egg fusion reflected its common
meaning at the time. Dr. LeJeune did not mean “completion of implantation,” which is the
definition of “conception.” Am. C. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, Terminology Bulletin:
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Davis, supra note 87, at *14-15. Dr. LeJeune testified that “upon fertilization, the entire
constitution of the man [human male and human female] is clearly, unequivocally spelled-out,
including arms, legs, nervous systems and the like; that upon inspection via DNA manipulation,
one can see the life codes for each of these otherwise unobservable elements of the unique
individual.” Id. at *27.
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in agreement with Dr. LeJeune, “that the cells of human embryos are comprised of differentiated
cells, unique in character and specialized to the highest degree of distinction.”89 Based on Dr.
LeJeune’s testimony, the trial court concluded that the “life codes for each special, unique
individual are resident at conception and animate the new person very soon after fertilization
occurs.”90 As discussed above, scientific research conducted since Dr. LeJeune’s 1989
testimony fully validates it. Observable scientific facts reveal that an individual identifiable
human life separate from the progenitors begins at fertilization.
The Tennessee Supreme Court’s 1992 decision, however, rejected Dr. LeJeune’s
testimony and embraced the opinions of the three other trial experts including Professor John
Robertson. Those opinions were based on statements of the Ethics Committee of the American
Fertility Society (AFS) issued in 1986.91 Ironically, the Tennessee Supreme Court rejected Dr.
LeJeune’s opinion, that no such thing as a pre-embryo exists, as unscientific, concluding that he
exhibited “profound confusion between science and religion,”92 but then approvingly cited the
AFS ethics statements in support of its own decision.93
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Id.
Id.
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The trial court noted that the three experts opposing Dr. LeJeune “rely at least to some degree
on the report of the Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society in forming the basis of
their opinions.” Id. at *16. Dr. Charles Alex Shivers testified that “[a]t the time of fertilization,
genetic controls are ‘locked in forever’ and control who the pre-embryo will later be, but ‘. . . as
far as we know . . . to my knowledge. . . there is no way to distinguish the cells; that they are
undifferentiated . . . .” Id. at *14. Professor Robertson also testified in the Davis trial that “[a]
human embryo is an entity composed of a group of undifferentiated cells which have no organs
or nervous system. That at about 10-14 days, the pre-embryo attaches itself to the uterine wall,
develops its primitive streak and life then commences.” Id. Dr. King, the treating IVF physician,
testified that at about 14 days the group of embryonic cells begins to differentiate in a process
that permits the eventual development of the different body parts which will become an
individual. Id. at *13.
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90

23

Each of the bases cited by the Tennessee Supreme Court in support of its ruling -- that
there is something called a “pre-embryo” that is not a human being but an “entity deserving
special respect” from days one to fourteen, and an “embryo” only at day fourteen and thereafter94
-- is demonstrably wrong in view of subsequent research regarding human embryonic
development (as discussed supra and infra).
The very term “pre-embryo” has been discredited. The International Federation of
Associations of Anatomists, which is charged with defining phases of human embryonic
development to appear in embryology textbooks, recommends against any scientific use of the
term.95 Embryologists confirm that it is scientifically inaccurate and ill-defined.96 That is not

American Fertility Society. Davis, 842 S.W.2d. at 593-94, 596, n.14. Davis references Chapter 8,
“The biologic characteristics of the preembryo.” Id. at 593-594, 31S-33S. Davis also references
Chapter 9, “The moral and legal status of the pre-embryo.” Id. at 596, 34S-36S. These reports are
a later edition of the AFS Ethics Statements quoted by the Davis trial court titled “Ethical
Considerations of the New Reproductive Technologies,” which appeared as in the Journal of the
American Fertility Society. Id. at 593. Of significance today the American Society for
Reproductive Medicine (ASRM) has a position statement against “personhood” of the embryo,
making allegations about the impact of recognizing the embryo as a person on the practice
medicine and instead describes the embryo as mere “fertilized reproductive tissues.” ASRM
Position Statement on Personhood Measures, AM. SOC’Y FOR REPROD. MED.
https://www.asrm.org/ASRM_Position_Statement_on_Personhood_Measures/.
94
Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 593-94, 596-97.
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See TE PrePublication, UNIFR at 10, n.32 (Apr. 21, 2010),
http://www.unifr.ch/ifaa/Public/EntryPage/ViewTE/TEe02.html; (“The foreshortened term 'preembryo', which has been used in legal and clinical contexts, is not recommended.”).
96
O’Rahilly, supra note 1, at 88. O’Rahilly explained why he did not use the term “pre-embryo”
in his medical textbook:
The term “pre-embryo” is not used here for the following reasons: (1) it is ill-defined
because it is said to end with the appearance of the primitive streak or to include
neurulation; (2) it is inaccurate because purely embryonic cells can already be
distinguished after a few days, as can also the embryonic (not pre-embryonic!) disc; (3) it
is unjustified because the accepted meaning of the word embryo includes all of the first 8
weeks; (4) it is equivocal because it may convey the erroneous idea that a new human
organism is formed at only some considerable time after fertilization; and (5) it was
introduced in 1986 ‘largely for public policy reasons’ (Biggers). … Just as postnatal age
begins at birth, prenatal age begins at fertilization. Id.
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surprising since, as noted by the trial court, the term “pre-embryo” was created by the IVF
industry itself to assist IVF practitioners defend themselves in malpractice suits.97
Subsequent scientific research refutes the distinction between embryo and pre-embryo.
Scientific factual observations of human embryo development reveal that far from being a
“multicellular aggregate of undifferentiated cells” until fourteen days after fertilization, a human
zygote “from the moment of sperm-egg fusion onward” exhibits “globally coordinated functions
that promote the health and survival of the individual as a whole.”98
The Court’s statement that “the first cellular differentiation of the new generation relates
to physiologic interaction with the mother, rather than to the establishment of the embryo itself,”

See also Ferrer Colomer et al., The Preembryo’s Short Lifetime. The History of a Word., 23
CUADERNOS DE BIOÉTICA 677, 678 (2013),
http://www.redalyc.org/html/875/87525473007/index.html. The term “preembryo” is rarely used
today in scientific and bioethical literature.
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Davis, supra note 87, at *20.
98
Condic, supra note 24, at 48. See also Renee Reijo Pera, Earlier, more accurate prediction of
embryo survival enabled by research, STAN. NEWS CTR. (Oct. 3, 2010),
http://med.stanford.edu/news/all-news/2010/10/earlier-more-accurate-prediction-of-embryosurvival-enabled-by-research.html. (Dr. Pera emphasized that early embryos are not
undifferentiated cell aggregates. She reported that she and her colleagues learned from filming
242 human zygotes developing that some cells in the eight-cell embryos express genes specific
to further development of the embryonic body, and other cells express mostly maternal genes.
She indicates that “[w]e've always thought of embryos as living or dying [as a whole], but in
reality we find each cell is making decisions autonomously.” Thus, the cells exhibit
differentiated behavior). See also Connie C. Wong et al., Non-invasive imaging of human
embryos before embryonic genome activation predicts development to the blastocyst stage, 28
NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 1115, 1119-20, fig.6 (2010); Renee Reijo Pera et al., Non-invasive
imaging of human embryos before embryonic genome activation predicts development to the
blastocyst stage, EXCEMED (2013), https://www.excemed.org/resources/l3-non-invasiveimaging-human-embryos-embryonic-genome-activation-predicts-development-blastocyst-stage.
(Dr. Pera noted that not all cells within the human embryo divide in synchrony, but on a selfdetermined schedule. Prior to her 2008 research, she and other scientists believed that all cells of
an eight-cell embryo acted as a colony, rather than each cell enacting its own program, which is
what actually happens. She said she was surprised to learn that, in fact, each cell enacts its own
program, which confirms that early embryo cells perform different tasks yet work in an
integrated, coordinated, organismic program to elaborate the body plan and supportive
structures).
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is also incorrect given the embryo acts as an organism.99 Scientific factual observation reveals
the cells in the early embryo work together to develop the embryo body together with the
placenta and cord cells.100 The inner cell mass that will make the cells of the embryo/human
body are believed to be present in two of the first four cells.101 The Davis Court also mistakenly
discounted the individuality of the “preembryo” prior to fourteen days of development,
referencing the AFS report.102
The Davis Court also relied on an AFS assertion that, at the eighth cell stage, the
developmental singleness of one person has not been established.103 This AFS statement is
outdated and incorrect. It is now known that only cells in earlier stages, perhaps up to the fourcell stage, may be totipotent (that is, "capable of generating a globally coordinated developmental
sequence" necessary to constitute an organism).104
Also, even assuming that a four-cell embryo possesses four totipotent cells, the embryo is
not thereby comprised of four human beings. The four cells work in concert toward development
unless and until disaggregated. If a four-cell embryo is scientifically manipulated to be taken
apart cell by cell to develop four separate embryos; or a six to eight cell embryo is split into two
three to four cells embryos to make two embryos, then the disaggregated cells need another

Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 594. (The Supreme Court cited Robertson’s law review article which
criticized the Davis trial court for ignoring “the biological reality that the early embryos, while
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the embryo itself develops.”). Robertson, supra note 72, at 482.
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embryos and its significance for early embryogenesis and implantation, 11 REPROD.
BIOMEDICINE ONLINE 206, 206-18 (2005). (The author, Robert Edwards won the Nobel Prize for
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102
Id. at 596.
103
Id. at 593.
104
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797, fig. 1 (2013), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3991987/.
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empty zona pellucida105 (the transparent more or less elastic noncellular outer layer or
envelope of a mammalian ovum that is composed of glycoproteins) 106 to be placed in, in
order for the disaggregated cells to grow as a human organism. The fact cells within an
organism can be artificially manipulated to become duplicate does not diminish the
human value of the developing organism or mean a human being is not in development.
Dr. Condic states: “Embryos repair injury. They adapt to changing environmental
conditions. Most importantly, they show coordinated interactions between parts (molecules,
cells, tissues, structures, and organs) that promote the survival, health, and continued
development of the organism as a whole.”107 One human being is developing as the cells divide
into more cells. Thus, “[t]he significant role of 'community effects' in development . . . clearly
illustrates that the behavior of cells in groups is distinct from the behavior of the individual cells
comprising the group.”108
Dr. Condic explains that when a human embryo at the blastocyst stage splits in half to
produce a twin, the developmental process does not start again from a single cell.109 Instead, the
different cells in each half of the embryo repair and regenerate themselves consistent with being
a human organism.110 Therefore, the fact that the human organism has a body plan to generate
identical (twin) siblings (or is capable of reproducing a twin) does not mean that an individual
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human being is not present both before and after reproducing.111
The additional AFS claim, cited by Davis,112 that an embryo is not a human being
because the embryo has not yet developed the “features of personhood,” ignores that all human
beings are not actually at all alike because each enjoys a unique genome, the internal
development blueprint that produced a unique human being, with an identity that is different
from other embryos. Cells in the early embryo are not featureless at all from the point of view
that really matters in human development: genes. The AFS (and the Davis Supreme Court in
reliance on the AFS) could ignore or discount such scientific knowledge in the 1990’s. Courts
may not do so today after the human genome has been mapped and its determinative influence
on human life from the moment of fertilization is well recognized.113

The AFS's related argument, that the “singleness” of a person is not established because each
cell in the early embryo has the "totipotent" ability to independently develop into a complete
adult, is meritless. (Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 593, citing AFS at 31S). Even assuming an eight-cell
embryo has eight totipotent cells, the embryo does not thereby comprise eight human beings.
One human being is developing. If one totipotent cell is manually extracted from the embryo at
this time (not a normal event in embryonic development), the cell can rebuild, given a nutritive
culture, and the remaining cells in the embryo from which the cell was extracted may regenerate
the missing cell. But this behavior confirms that the extracted cell and the remaining intact cells
each continue to behave as organisms after the cell is extracted. It does not in any way suggest
that the embryo was somehow not a “single” organism before the totipotent cell was extracted.
It was a single organism, just as an embryo prior to twinning is a single organism. Condic, supra
note 104, at 804.
112
Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 596.
113
See Helen Pearson, Your destiny, from day one, 418 NATURE PUBLISHING GROUP NEWS
FEATURE 14, 15 (July 4, 2002),
http://www.public.iastate.edu/~zool.433/Lectures/mammal.egg.assym.pdf. (She states the
following:
Your world was shaped in the first 24 hours after conception. Where your head and feet
would sprout, and which side would form your back and which your belly, were being
defined in the minutes and hours after sperm and egg united.
111

Just five years ago, this statement would have been heresy. Mammalian embryos were
thought to spend their first few days as a featureless orb of cells. Only later, at about the
time of implantation into the wall of the uterus, were cells thought to acquire distinct
‘fates’ determining their positions in the future body. But by tagging specific points on
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Similarly, the AFS worry that an embryo is not a real human being because the embryo
may die before reaching its potential,114 is no valid ground for denying human being status to an
embryo.115 The same point can be made of any moment in a human being’s life trajectory. Life
issues no guarantee of continuity to anyone. Lady Justice wears a blindfold and would not
speculate on the vulnerability of the human being invoking the courts protection to secure the
unalienable right to life through a parent willing to take responsibility to care and nurture his or
her offspring.
In short, none of the reasons cited by the Davis court is scientifically correct in light of
current scientific research. While an early human embryo can be empirically observed in various
recognized stages of development (ootid, zygote, embryo, fetus, baby, child, adolescent, adult,
elder, etc.), “pre-embryo” is not one of these stages because a human organism is a whole human
being in each developmental stage.116
Unfortunately, all subsequent case precedent has relied in whole or in part on Davis's

mammalian eggs shortly after fertilization, researchers have now shown that they come to
lie at predictable points in the embryo. Rather than being a naive sphere, it seems that a
newly fertilized egg has a defined top–bottom axis that sets up the equivalent axis in the
future embryo. . . .
What is clear is that developmental biologists will no longer dismiss early mammalian
embryos as featureless bundles of cells.) Id.
114
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Such a decision would doubtless have had the effect of outlawing IVF programs in the state of
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not a necessary outcome of recognizing the full humanity of a human embryo, as demonstrated
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scientifically invalid analysis classifying embryos as deserving respect more than any other
human tissue, rather than acknowledging, as the Patent Office does, that human embryos are
human organisms.117
No later court has undertaken a re-analysis of the parties’ rights and interests regarding
the subject matter at issue, the embryos’ fate, based on correctly identifying the nature of the
human embryos as a human beings and human offspring who are existing with full potential to
complete life’s cycle and identifiable DNA distinct from the parties/ progenitors/parents who
want the court to resolve their dispute over the embryos fate. These cases do not provide cogent
or authoritative precedent for a decision based upon current scientific knowledge that would
permit the rights and interests of all parties concerning the embryos at issue to be correctly
identified and weighed on the scales of justice.
D. KASS v. KASS, DID NOT CHALLENGE THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE
EMBRYOS AS NONPERSONS UNDER FEDERAL AND NEW YORK LAW,
NOR THE NATURE OF THE HUMAN EMBRYOS AS DESCRIBED IN DAVIS,
BUT TREATED THE EMBRYOS AS UNDIFFERENTIATED CELLULAR
PROPERTY OF MOTHER AND FATHER THAT COULD BE OWNED BY A
CLINIC PURSUSANT TO CONTRACT, CONTRARY TO THE TRIAL COURT
FINDING THAT STORED EMBRYOS WERE PROCREATED POTENTIAL
LIFE WITH FATE TO BE DETERMINED BY THE MOTHER, AND THE
RIGHTS INVOLVED WERE MORE PRECIOUS THAN PROPERTY RIGHTS.
After the Davis case, the trial court in Kass v. Kass was the next court to address a
parental dispute regarding the fate of stored embryos.118 At both the trial and appellate levels, the
courts treated the nature of the parents’ interest in their cryopreserved offspring as a property
interest, even though in the Davis decision the embryos were deemed neither person nor
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property.119 The Kass offspring were at an earlier stage of development than the four to eight
cell embryos described in the Davis case, and the offspring were defined as “pre-zygotes,” as
were the embryos in the York case.120
At the trial stage, the Kass case raised the questions as to when procreation occurs and
what rights a person not bearing the created life has to request termination of even a “potential
life.”121 The trial court saw the embryos as procreated potential life whose fate depended on the
mother’s choice, and thought the rights at issue were far more precious than property rights,
noting it was absurd to equate zygotes with property like washing machines and jewelry.122 In
contrast, the highest court of New York in describing the development of the early embryos,
paints a picture of the stored embryos as undifferentiated cells in quoting the description by the
Davis court.123 The appellate courts emphasized deciding the embryos fate based on the
contractual rights of the parties as the appropriate remedy, when disputes arise as to the fate of
stored embryos.124
In Kass, the IVF clinic document claimed that “pre-zygotes” were subject to a property
settlement if the parties divorced.125 A “pre-zygote” was defined as eggs penetrated by sperm
which have not yet joined genetic material.126 When IVF services were first provided, some
providers believed a new human life was not yet created if the fertilized egg was cryopreserved
before the pronuclei of the egg and sperm membranes broke down and the chromosomes lined
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up at the cell’s center to form a cleavage spindle, allowing the cell to split into two cells with
identical chromosomes.127
The Kass trial court did not have a trial with experts to address the nature of “prezygotes.”128 The trial court defined a zygote as a cell formed by the union of two reproductive
cells or gametes.129 The court claimed that the term most commonly used following creation is
pre-embryo (no citation provided by court) and the court would use both terms
interchangeably.130 The Kass trial court thought a key to an intelligent discussion was if the
product of an in vitro fertilization had a conceptual or propositional difference from the product
of an in vivo fertilization.131
The trial court commented that:
Fertilization is fertilization and fertilization of the ovum is the inception of the
reproductive process. Biological life exists from that moment forward, the fact
that an in vitro zygote does not seek to fulfill its biological destiny immediately
upon such fertilization does not alter that fact. The rights of the parties are
dependent on the nature of the zygote not the stage of its development or
locations.132
Unlike the Davis Tennessee Supreme Court, the Kass trial court reasoned that a right not
to procreate was waived for a husband after coital reproduction and it would be waived and nonexistent after participation in an in vitro program.133 The court noted that to transform a right not
to procreate founded in restraint to a right to take positive steps to terminate a potential human
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life, was a right the Supreme Court of the United States expressly refused to recognize.134
The Kass trial court then examined the conduct of the wife and the clinic informed consent
form to determine if the parties’ constitutional rights were waived.135 The trial court found
express terms “[i]n the event of divorce, we understand that legal ownership of any pre-zygotes
must be determined in a property settlement and will be released as directed by order of a Court
of competent jurisdiction” meant the clinic agreement regarding the embryos distribution would
be subject to directives of the divorce court.136 An addendum to the consent form indicated that
if the husband and wife did not want to initiate a pregnancy and were “unable to make a
decision” about what to do, then they would let the “pre-zygotes” be disposed of by the IVF
Program for approved research investigation.137 The trial court reasoned that terms in the
Addendum were contingent upon neither party being able to determine the disposition, and did
not think there was any rule of construction that would apply the addendum in the clinic contract
to a divorce situation.138
Later, the appellate court rejected the trial ruling that the mother alone had the power to
decide the fate of the zygote and ruled that a woman’s right to privacy and bodily integrity like
the one in Roe v. Wade are not implicated before implantation occurs.139 The appeals court
unanimously believed that when the parties in the custody dispute had an agreement about the
disposition of unused fertilized eggs the agreement should control.140
The highest court in New York treated the embryos as property and held that the clinic
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contract that allowed for the clinic to use the “pre-zygotes” for approved research investigation if
the parties were unable to come to a decision was valid, and therefore the clinic was awarded the
embryos. This implies that the New York highest court did not consider the embryos as human
beings, but considered the embryos as cellular or tissue property, in allowing an institution, the
clinic, to receive the embryos for research. While the trial court had considered the Kass
offspring potential life, and found pursuant to Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth,
there was no right to terminate potential human life by a person who was not carrying the
offspring, the recognition of the right of a parent to protect offspring was not discussed in Kass
by the highest New York Court reviewing the trial court decision.141
The highest court in Kass v. Kass accepted and relied on the factual statements about how
cells differentiate from the Davis case, in that the court stated:
Once a sperm cell fertilizes the egg, this fusion –or pre-zygote-divides until it
reaches the four- to eight-cell stage, after which several pre-zygotes are transferred
to the woman’s uterus by a cervical catheter. If the procedure succeeds, an embryo
will attach itself to the uterine wall, differentiate and develop into a fetus…. 142
This above statement by the Kass court illustrates the State Court of New York’s
scientific terminology confusion and misunderstanding as to the factual nature and development
of a fertilized ovum or offspring created. First, according to embryologists that rely on the
Carnegie Stages terminology to describe human embryonic development, there is no “prezygote”
after a human organism has chromosomes lined up at the cleavage spindle and has further
divided into two cells within the embryo.143 Second, a zygote is a one cell embryo, as described
in most scientific literature and a zygote does not have multiple cells, nor does a “pre-zygote”
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have multiple cells but is a term to describe the zygote at a stage of development prior to the
chromosomes lining up at the cleavage spindle in the zygote cell before division.144 Third, a one
cell zygote behaves as a human organism from the moment of sperm and egg binding.145 Fourth,
cell differentiation among cells within the embryo is observed in the early embryo prior to
implantation.146
The wrong assumption about the biological status of the pre-zygote led to the decision in
Kass, which favored a property contractual remedy for the fate of the “pre-zygotes.”147 Yet, the
Kass court denied it needed to determine the legal status of the embryos.148 Rather than
scientifically viewing the facts about the nature of the embryo, the Kass court found the embryos
were not persons under constitutional law.149 Thus, having determined for constitutional
purposes the “pre-zygotes” were not persons, the Kass court opined the next step in the test was
who had the decision-making authority.150 The highest court held the “parties’ agreement” had
the authority and it did not have to determine the legal status of the embryos or balance the rights
of the parties as the Davis court did.151
Note: a clinic drafted consent form for the embryos fate that was agreed upon was
upheld, despite the fact that a parent wanted to protect their offspring and a lower court did not
find the agreed clinic contract allowing the clinic to own the embryos, when the progenitors were
undecided about what to do, should apply when progenitors divorce and had disagreement about
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what to do. The Kass precedent that a corporation, a fictional person, has rights to conduct
research on embryos under a contract (over the objection of a parent seeking to protect offspring)
was founded on property law that ignored constitutional rights that protect parental rights to
protect offspring.152 Further, the decision in Kass was based on erroneous misconceived science
that thought the stored human embryo was not a human being and the decision was also based on
case precedent in federal and state law that did not know when human life begins.
Yet, the importance that a procreation right had been exercised is reflected indirectly in
the opinion, as the Kass court stressed that the agreement of the parties prior to the time of the
procedure to create offspring was to govern by stating:
[C]ourts seek to honor the parties’ expressions of choice, made before disputes
erupt, with the parties’ over-all direction uppermost in the analysis. Knowing
advance agreement will be enforced underscores the seriousness and the integrity
of the consent process. Advance agreements as to disposition would have little
purpose if they were enforceable only in the event the parties continue to agree. To
the extent possible it should be the progenitors---not the State----and not the courts-- who by their prior directive made this deeply personal choice.153
Note, a progenitor is one who has provided a gamete for the procreation of a child and
one would need to procreate a child to be the child’s progenitor.154 The parties in Kass did not
raise the issue of the legality of the clinic’s form presented to them that described the embryos as
joint property. Despite one of the progenitors’ coming to a decision of wanting to care and
provide for the human beings created, a contract analysis of a clinic consent form resulted in the
clinic receiving the embryos, because the court bound the progenitors to a contract that claimed
the clinic had the authority to use embryos for research if the progenitors were undecided as to
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what to do.155
E. FEDERAL COURT REFUSED STANDING TO HUMAN EMBRYOS IN DOE
V. SHALALA.
When a ban was lifted on funding for research involving human embryos, a lawsuit was
filed on behalf of Mary Doe, “a preborn child in being as a human embryo” along with other
plaintiffs, to block a nationally appointed panel making guidelines about embryo research.156
The court stated the embryo was not a “person” under the Fourteenth Amendment, and therefore
could not have a guardian appointed to represent her pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 17(c) and further
to have a guardian represent all 20,000 embryos believed to be in storage at that time would be
an impossible task.157
F. VIRGINIA FEDERAL COURT TREATED EMBRYOS, SPERM AND EGGS
CONTAMINATED WITH HUMAN ALBUMIN EXPOSED TO CRUZEFELDJACOBS DISEASE AS AN ECONOMIC LOSS PRECLUDING RECOVERY
UNDER NEGLIGENCE, AND CLAIMED PLAINTIFFS SOUGHT TO
RECOVER A LOSS FOR PHYSICIAL HARM TO PROPERTY OTHER THAN
THE ALBUMIN MANUFACTURED BY DEFENDANT, BAXTER, AND
DISTRIBUTED BY DEFENDANT, IRVINE, IN DOE v. IRVINE SCIENTIFIC.
A class action lawsuit was brought by plaintiffs who underwent in-vitro fertilization
treatment at the Jones Institute for Women’s Health.158 Specific plaintiffs, Jane and John Doe
had embryos created with donor eggs from a third party, and John’s sperm.159 Three embryos
were transferred to Jane Doe for hopeful implantation, while the other embryos were
cryopreserved.160 The Jones Institute had utilized the Human Albumin product manufactured by
Baxter Healthcare Corporation (Baxter) and was distributed by Irvine Scientific Sales Company
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(Irvine) in the process of creating the embryos.161 The Human Albumin was potentially
contaminated by two donors to the pool of plasma from which the lots were processed, who were
found to be at risk for Cruzeldt-Jacob Disease, which causes a fatal neurological disorder in
humans.162 The plaintiffs claimed the Jones Institute was not timely informed of Baxter’s
withdrawal of the contaminated Albumin and that it failed to timely warn the distributors and
consumers in the stream of commerce about the dangers of the product.163 Plaintiffs further
alleged that Irvine failed to timely cooperate with Baxter and withdraw the contaminated
albumin and want of the dangers based on Federal Drug Administration recommendations.164
Plaintiffs’ complaint sought recovery based on theories of personal injury, property damage,
emotional distress and economic loss.165
The motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional
distress was denied on the basis there was no record evidence that CJD had actually
contaminated “the three reproductive organisms.”166 The Virginia Federal Court, without
scientific analysis, equated the sperm, egg, and embryo to all be “reproductive organisms.”167
Yet, a sperm by itself cannot make a human body, nor can an egg make a human body by
itself. Unlike the human embryo, which has all the components needed to reveal the body plan in
an orderly and temporal sequence both pre and postnatally, sperm and egg only have a plan to
bind with another gamete. While the court’s inaccurate scientific analysis of what a sperm and
an egg is compared to an embryo did not refute the courts finding of no proof of contamination
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or harm to the embryo, it revealed a lack of appreciation of the distinct difference between
gametes and the procreated embryo.
The Virginia Federal Court in analyzing whether the plaintiffs could recover in tort,
reasoned the harm was to the embryos and the embryos were not persons pursuant to Roe v.
Wade;168 and the court had not recognized a status that would entitle them to special treatment
because of their potential of human life.169 The Virginia Federal Court did acknowledge the case
of Davis v. Davis, which found the embryos deserved a special respect legal status for just the
potential for life.170 Nonetheless, the Virginia Federal Court claimed Plaintiffs could not bring a
tort action on the embryos behalf and dismissed the tort and negligence claim.171
The Virginia Federal Court stated the gist of the Plaintiffs claim was to recover the loss
of their stored embryos which were rendered unsafe for implantation as a result of being exposed
to the recalled albumin.172 The court claimed the losses occurred, because the Jones Institute
goods and services were unsatisfactory, the transferred embryos did not result in a pregnancy,
and the other embryos were unsafe for implantation.173 The Virginia Federal Court reasoned the
plaintiffs were seeking to recover from harm to “property” other than the albumin manufactured
by Baxter and distributed by Irvine.174 The court characterized the plaintiffs’ loss as neither
personal or property injury, but an economic loss, because economic expectations were
disappointed.175 Plaintiffs could not recover against defendants for economic loss, because they
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had not complied with the economic loss rule and showed privity with the defendants.176 Thus,
the complaint was dismissed.177
Today, if a court would equate the embryo as a “good” created in an IVF clinic, or
property, or the equivalent of a gamete, then that would be an analysis based on flawed scientific
facts and the Roe decision that did not know when human life began.
G. IN AN UNPUBLISHED OPINION, MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS,
AFFIREMED A TRIAL COURT DECISION ON CONTRACT AND CUSTODY
CLAIMS INVOLVING “FROZEN HUMAN CELLS, (ZYGOTES)”, CLAIMING
THE DISPUTE INVOLVED TWO GAMETE PROVIDERS AND
UNDETERMINED RIGHTS OF EX-UTERO PREEMBRYONIC CELLS IN
BOHN V. ANN ARBOR REPRODUCTIVE MEDICINE ASSOCIATES, P. C.
A trial court in Michigan ruled that until the progenitors of embryos stored at the clinic
would reach an agreement, their zygotes would remain cryopreserved and in the possession of
the clinic.178 The opinion stated “[o]f the eighteen oocytes removed from plaintiff’s body and
inseminated with defendant Mosbly’s sperm, eight became ‘partially fertilized’ or ‘zygotes,’ in
that the two nuclei from the oocyte and the sperm did not merge and no cell division took
place.”179 Three of the zygotes were transferred to the mother resulting in the birth of one child
and five zygotes remained in storage.180 The Court of Appeals in the first footnote on the word
“zygote” stated “[t]he stage of development and thus, the proper scientific term for these human
cells is not clear from the limited record before us. Although the term may not be accurate, we
will refer to the cells at issue here as zygotes for purposes of this discussion.”181
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The Michigan court acknowledged that the case concerned a number of complicated
questions concerning the parameters of human life and its protection for which there were no
clearly defined answers in Michigan law or jurisprudence.182 The court reported that the state of
Louisiana had codified the legal status of pre-embryos as persons referencing La. Rev. Stat. Ann.
Sec 9.124 (1991), but that Michigan had no comparable law.183 While the plaintiff mother,
Bohn, had premised many of her claims to the embryos on a woman’s right to bodily integrity,
the court said that was not at issue since a pregnancy was not involved.184 The court claimed the
dispute involved two gamete providers and undetermined rights of ex-utero pre-embryonic
cells.185
The Michigan court thought the facts in the case raised questions of the utmost gravity,
and there was no question that the state had an interest in protecting “potential life.”186 The
question of when life begins was not raised in the trial court; thus, the court declined to address a
question that reached beyond those issues framed by the plaintiff in her complaint and cited in
the trial court, but urged the Michigan legislature to attend to the profoundly complicated and
unexplored area.187
The mother had argued that Black’s Law Dictionary defined a child as: “progeny;
offspring of parentage, Unborn or recently born human being.”188 Thus, the Michigan Child
Custody Act189applies to “children.” The Court of Appeals did not want to extend the definition

182

Id. at *3.
Id. at *4.
184
Id.
185
Id.
186
Id.
187
Id. at *5.
188
Id. at *16.
189
MCL 722.21 et. seq., MSA 25.312 (1).
183

41

of “child” as suggested by the plaintiff mother, stating authority in Michigan that such as
extension would require legislative rather than judicial action.190 As a result, it did not address
whether the father had an obligation of child support of zygotes, because the father consented to
conception and there was no statutory authority for the support of zygotes and no child support
issue raised.191
The mother’s claim against the clinic for a breach of contract to transfer the zygotes to
her, because documents indicated the medical staff had discretion as to whether zygotes would
be transferred or preserved and a medical authorization form, does not constitute a contract under
Michigan law.192 In addition, there was no writing signed by an authorized representative of the
clinic as to the essential terms of the alleged contract.193 The count found no evidence of fraud
or misrepresentation.194 Further, the court found no breach of the mother’s privacy by the clinic
in releasing information to defendant, Mosley, that she had undergone the zygote intra fallopian
transfer (ZIFT) and had five stored embryos, as he was co-creator of the zygotes and knew of
their existence, and she had announced her complaint on television and it was proper for the
defendant attorneys to look into the matter.195 The court noted the plaintiff could not claim the
defendant clinic could not be charged with extreme and outrageous conduct in not releasing to
her the embryos created from her ova, because she ignored that they were also created with
defendant Mosley’s gametes.196 The plaintiff could not claim negligent infliction from
emotional distress in watching the embryos “slowly die,” as the defendants presented evidence
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that the embryos could be stored indefinitely.197
The Michigan Court of Appeals recognized an important issue in the case was when did
human life begin, but did not think it had to address it since it was not addressed in the trial
court.198 The Court of Appeals, which acknowledged that the state had an interest in protecting
“potential life,” was not destroying life as it was informed that the embryos could stay stored
indefinitely, but did not ask the future question as to whether that ruling meant the party that
outlived the other party would have the ultimate decision on the embryos fate, nor did it decide if
the zygotes were lives with potential rather than potential life.199 There was no discussion of the
Michigan court about the differences between human cells and human beings other than
deferring to the legislature to give it guidance in the future.200 Michigan choose not to publish its
opinion and give it precedential value, yet it has been cited in an ACLU amicus brief in
McQueen v. Gadberry,201 for the proposition that an embryo should not be allowed to be
“procreated” by giving the embryo to the parent who wants continued life for the embryo and
forcing the other parent to procreate. Note, this was not what was stated by the Michigan Court.
Further, the understanding that after sperm-egg binding a human organism does not exist is
incorrect as explained in this article. This case was not about frozen human cells like the HeLa
cells used in tissue culture, but about frozen human beings in the earliest observable
developmental stages. Courts can take judicial notice of known scientific facts, unlike the
Michigan Court of Appeals which admittedly did not know the accurate scientific description of
the subjects at issue, and thought it was for the legislature to determine the rights of ex-utero pre-
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embryonic cells, not realizing the zygotes were human organisms with identities distinct from
other organisms.
H. ALABAMA LAW ALLOWED AGREED CONTRACT PLAIN LANGUAGE
TO PERMIT A UNIVERSITY TO OWN EMBRYOS IN CAHILL v. CAHILL.
In Cahill v. Cahill, during a divorce proceeding in Alabama, the wife sought an award
under a property theory for the three remaining zygotes stored in Michigan.202 The court began
the resolution process asking for a copy of the contract signed with the University where the
zygotes were stored.203 The actual contract was not found, but a blank form was provided to the
court and the terms of the agreement were not disputed.204 Pursuant to the plain language, the
agreement provided that if there was dissolution of marriage, the zygotes were relinquished to
the “Physicians of the Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology.”205 The court ordered “the
zygotes shall not be the property of either party” and according to the evidence, the University of
Michigan appears to be the owners of the zygotes.206 The Cahill case demonstrates how like in
Kass and Litowitz, the characterization of human life as property has led to corporate persons
having rights to own human beings as property.
I. THE MASSACHUSETTS COURT, DID NOT RECOGNIZE EMBRYOS CAME
TO BE CREATED AS THE RESULT OF EXERCISED PROCREATION RIGHTS
AND HELD A POLICY AGAINST FORCED PROCREATION WOULD USURP
PRIOR PARTY AGREEMENT TO PERMIT EMBRYO DEVELOPMENT IN
THE CASE OF A.Z. v. B.Z.
In A.Z. v. B.Z.,207 the Supreme Court of Massachusetts examined consent forms signed
by the parties and testimony about the conduct of the parties in executing the agreement and
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concluded the forms did not represent the clear intention of the parties as to the proper
disposition of their embryos should a later dispute arise between them.208 The court also
examined the question of whether prior directives should ever be enforced by courts in embryo
disputes.209 The court concluded that “even had the [progenitors] entered into an unambiguous
agreement between themselves regarding the disposition of frozen pre-embryos, [it] would not
enforce an agreement that would” permit the use of a frozen embryo for implantation by one
progenitor over the objection of the other, because such an agreement “would compel one donor
to become a parent against his or her will.”210 Further, the court ruled that “forced procreation is
not an area amenable to judicial enforcement” and would violate public policy.211 No argument
was made that the husband was already a parent or that the frozen embryos were human beings.
No argument was made the frozen embryos were human beings entitled to the basic human right
of life itself. Basically, “conception was the goal in A.Z.-the desire not to be a parent was only
manifested after conception had already taken place.”212
J. NEW JERSEY CLINIC FORM DESCRIBED EMBRYOS AS MERE TISSUES
AND PROVIDED FOR RELINQUISHMENT OF TISSUES TO THE CLINIC IN
THE EVENT OF DIVORCE, UNLESS THE COURT SPECIFIED OTHERWISE,
IN J.B v. M.B, WHERE THE COURT, RELYING ON DAVIS, THOUGHT THE
RIGHT NOT TO PROCREATE SHOULD ORDINARILY PREVAIL WHEN
PARTIES DISAGREE, AND HELD PARTY RIGHTS SHOULD BE BALANCED
WHEN PARTIES DISAGREE AFTER ORIGINAL AGREEMENT AS TO THE
EMBRYOS FATE.
J.B. filed a divorce complaint and asked for an order permitting the remaining seven
embryos to be discarded, but M.B. sought to have the embryos implanted or donated to other
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infertile couples.213 In the J.B. v. M.B. case, the court referenced the American Heritage
Stedman’s Medical Dictionary for a definition of a pre-embryo as a fertilized ovum (egg cell) up
to approximately fourteen days old (the point at which it implants in the uterus).214 In addition,
the court emphasized how “[t]hroughout the opinion [they] use[d] the term ‘preembryo” rather
than ‘embryo’ because a preembryo is technically descriptive of the cells stage of development
when they are cryopreserved (frozen).”215
Note that the courts use of words “cells stage of development” would not show the court
had an understanding a human organism is what was cryopreserved. It appears all the court
references were to the American Heritage Stedmans Medical Dictionary. The court reported a
zygote develops into a four to eight-cell preembryo that are returned to a woman’s uterus for
implantation or cryopreserved.216
J.B.’s and M.B.’s consent agreement with the clinic stated in pertinent part: “I, J.B.
(patient), and M.B. (partner) agree that all control, direction and ownership of our tissues will be
relinquished to the IVF Program under the following circumstances: 1. A dissolution of marriage
by court order, unless the court specifies who takes control and direction of the tissues.”217
In analyzing the consent form, the court held that the thrust of the document was that the
clinic obtains control over the pre-embryos unless the parties choose otherwise in a writing, or
unless a court directs otherwise in the case of divorce.218 The court first did a contact analysis
and found that there was not a binding separate contact providing for disposition, but a decision
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that in the event of divorce the court was to be the one to decide the disposition of the preembryos.219
M.B. had sought a remand to the lower court to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine
the parties’ intentions at the time of the I.V.F. procedure.220 However, the court did not remand
the case to the trial court to take evidence on husband’s claim, that there were extensive
discussions, as to whether they were going to use the embryos themselves or donate to others. The
husband also claimed his religious convictions and the state interest in protecting human life
should take precedence over his wife not wanting to use the embryos as agreed. The wife claimed
giving the husband the embryos was violative of public policy and her right not to procreate.
The court held that a formal, unambiguous memorialization of the parties intentions
would be required to confirm their prior agreement and that since such writing was lacking and
held that J.B. and M. B. never entered into a binding contract providing for the disposition of the
pre-embryosin the possession of the Cooper Center.221 The court, also, agreed with Davis,
supra, that “[ordinarily the party wishing to avoid procreation should prevail.”222 But, the court
disagreed as to the strict enforcement of contracts stating: “[w]e believe that the better rule, and
the one we adopt is to enforce agreements entered into at the time in vitro fertilization is begun,
subject to the right of either party to change their mind about disposition or use or destruction of
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any stored pre-embryos.”223 Finally, if there is disagreement as to the disposition because one
party has reconsidered his or her earlier decision, the interests of both parties must be
evaluated.224
Thus, the failure of court to recognize embryos were not mere tissue as described in the
clinic form, or undifferentiated cells as described in Davis, but deliberately created human beings
led to a perpetuation of the Robertson principle accepted by the Davis court, that a right to avoid
procreation should prevail on the mistaken factual understanding that an embryo was
undifferentiated cells that would first be placenta and cord cells before the body of the embryo
was formed.
K. IN RHODE ISLAND, THREE COUPLES SUING AN IVF CLINIC FOR LOSS
OF “PRE-EMBRYOS” WERE ALLOWED TO PROCEED WITH A CLAIM FOR
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS DUE TO BREACH OF CONTRACT FOR WHICH
THE CLINIC CLAIMED THE DEFENSE OF ASSUMPTION OF THE RISK,
BUT NOT A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS.
In Frisina v. Women & Infants Hospital of Rhode Island, three couples sought recovery
against the IVF clinic for loss of their embryos under a theory that they suffered emotional
distress and that their right of action in their pre-embryos was because embryos were
“irreplaceable property.”225 The Frisina, court referenced A.Z. v. B.Z. for the statement that the
term pre-embryo is used to describe the four to eight cell developmental stage of a fertilized
egg.226 The Frisina court also looked at the embryos custody dispute precedent regarding
parental rights and interest in their embryos.227 The clinic claimed the damages were the failure
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to achieve a pregnancy, and under Rhode Island law since there was no recovery for a nonviable
fetus there should not be recovery for a pre-embryo.228
The court found that given that Rhode Island law did not allow recovery for a nonviable
fetus, the plaintiffs were not present when the embryos were lost, and they did not have a
physical manifestation of their emotional distress, they failed to meet the elements for negligent
infliction of emotional distress.229 The court agreed, however; that the plaintiffs were seeking to
recover for loss of the embryos and not the failure to achieve a pregnancy and further found that
while the plaintiffs signed an informed consent acknowledging that the embryos could be lost
due to laboratory error, they did not exculpate the clinic from the clinic’s negligence.230
Therefore the plaintiff could pursue a cause of action for a breach of contract causing emotional
distress.
Thus, while Frisina was not asked to claim that “pre-embryos” were persons and rely on
other case precedent for its understanding of the nature of the embryo, it found a cause of action
for the specific loss of the “pre-embryo” at that stage of development, and did not require an
analysis of whether the particular lost embryos would have ultimately been born, albeit by a
property based theory awarding parents the loss of “irreplaceable property.”
L. THE WASHINGTON COURT CLAIMED THERE WAS NO AUTHORITY
BEFORE IT AS TO WHETHER “PRE-EMBRYO” OR CHILD WAS THE
PROPER TERM AND THE COURT DENIED THE REQUEST OF EACH
PARTY TO HAVE THE EMBRYOS FOR IMPLANTATION AND AWARDED
THE EMBRYOS TO THE CLINIC BASED ON CONTRACT LANGUAGE IN
LITOWITZ v. LITOWITZ.
In Litowitz v. Litowitz, a question before the court was the award of two cryopreserved
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embryos to David Litowitz.231 Both divorcing parties wanted the frozen embryos to be
implanted, but Becky Litowitz, who had no uterus, wanted to have them implanted in a surrogate
and to raise them herself.232 On the other hand, David Litowitz wanted to have them placed for
adoption.233 The trial court had applied a best interest of the child standard and awarded them to
David holding adoption by a two parent family was in the best interest of the child.234
The Washington Appellate Court looked at the contract and concluded that the contract
did not require a continuation of a family plan not to have another child and thought David
Litowitz had a right not to procreate and he was given the embryos because adoption allowed
him to avoid an unwanted parenting role.235
The Washington Supreme Court applied the Davis framework principles, noting that
Becky argued the egg donor contract gave her a right to the “pre-embryos” and biological
parenting should not be the only factor in deciding who received the embryos.236 The court
differentiated between the egg donor contract and the cryopreservation contract and held the egg
donor contract did not apply to fertilized eggs.237 Becky argued the term “child” rather than the
term “pre-embryo” was the appropriate term for the court to consider and that she had a
constitutional right to the custody and companionship of a child.238 While the trial judge
characterized the “pre-embryo” as a “child,” the Washington Supreme Court thought the issue
whether a pre-embryo was a child was not a logical or relevant inquiry under the record before
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the court and the argument was not supported by sufficient authority.239
In making its ruling, the Litowitz court stated it did not have to engage in a medical or
philosophical discussion whether the pre-embryos were children or if Becky was a progenitor
without citing additional authority.240 The decision was solely based on the cryopreservation
contract.241 Here,
[t]hey directed that the remaining pre-embryos be ‘thawed out but not allowed to
undergo further development and disposed of when the pre-embryos have been
maintained in cryopreservation for five (5) years under the initial date of
cryopreservation unless the Center agreed at [the Litowitzes’ request, to extend
[their] participation for an additional period of time.242
The record did not indicate if the two cryopreserved pre-embryos were still in existence, and
neither party had requested an extension of time.243 The court concluded that “[c]ustody of the
remaining two pre-embryos was taken by the Loma Linda Center under the cryopreservation
contract on the date the other three were implanted in the surrogate mother.”244 Thus, the award
to David Litowitz was reversed. 245
Justice Chambers commented that the case should have been remanded to the trial court
to evaluate the case under a contract principle.246 Another justice noted the contract provided for
a court order in the event of divorce and the contractual storage limit was tolled by the filing of
the lawsuit.247 Justice Sanders emphasized what the parties did not intend was for the subject of
the contract to be destroyed, and he could not fault a trial judge who reached a result to at least

239

Id.
Id. at 264.
241
Id.
242
Id. at 271.
243
Id.
244
Id.
245
Id.
246
Id. (Chambers, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
247
Id. at 272-73 (Sanders, J., dissenting).
240

51

effectuate the intent of the parties and recognized the contract dealt with the prospect that a child
would be born, and the future of which was of paramount concern and profound responsibility.248
Essentially, the Litowitz court by applying a strict contract resolution to the dispute over
the embryos fate treated the embryos as property on the basis there was not authority before it to
establish that the embryos were children. The Litowitz case is an example of innocent human
lives being terminated by court order, contrary to the intent of both parties/parents requesting the
clinic not to have control of the embryos for destruction pursuant to a form provided to the
parties/parents by the clinic.
M. THE IOWA COURT WOULD NOT RESOLVE A DISPUTE OVER THE
STORED EMBRYOS FATE BETWEEN PROGENITORS/PARENTS CLAIMING
THAT IOWA COURTS CONCERN IS WITH BORN CHILDREN AND DID NOT
RECOGNIZE REPRODUCTION HAD ALREADY OCCURRED IN RE:
MARRIAGE OF WITTEN.
In the case of In Re: Marriage of Witten, the male progenitor, Trip, did not want to
destroy the embryos but did not want his ex-wife Tamera to have them.249 The court was to
determine if either party could use or dispose of their embryos without the consent of the
other.250 The court was to determine if the embryos have the legal status of children pursuant to
Iowa Dissolution of Marriage statutes and not to address the moral and philosophical status of
the embryos.251 The court stated in Iowa that the state is concerned for the physical, emotional
and psychological well-being of children who have been born, not fertilized eggs that have not
resulted in a pregnancy.252 The court believed it was against public policy to force an agreement
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in the highly personal area of “reproductive choice.”253 The court did not recognize that
reproduction had already taken place. The Witten court noted that “[w]hether embryos are
viewed as having life or simply as having the potential for life, this characteristic or potential
renders embryos fundamentally distinct from the chattels, real estate and money that are the
subject of antenuptial agreements.”254 Thus, unlike contracts where property is distributed
according to prenuptial agreements, the state would not intervene to make a decision or enforce a
disputed contract on the embryos fate, but required the parents to resolve the matter by their
contemporaneous mutual consent.255
Although the court rejected a contract approach to resolving a dispute about disposition
of the parties’ stored embryos, it would honor a contract where the parties did not dispute.256
The court stated there would be no use or disposition of the embryos until the parties reached an
agreement, with the caveat that the clinic was not required to store the embryos beyond the time
in the clinic contract.257
The Witten embryo dispute contemporaneous mutual consent resolution model, which
was similar to the resolution model of the Michigan Court of Appeals in Bohn, was criticized
subsequently for not resolving the dispute between the parent/progenitors who were seeking the
courts assistance, and would result in being able to leave one party hostage to the other who
refuses to agree.258
This mutual consent resolution model seems to award the decision as to the embryos fate
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to the parent who outlives the other parent and runs the risk of pushing embryo disposition
decisions to future generations, since frozen embryos can outlive their progenitors. Live births
have been reported from stored embryos a decade and more (even up to twenty-four years) after
cryopreservation.259 Most importantly, the contemporaneous mutual consent resolution model
does not recognize the dignity of a human being by making an embryo dispute resolution in the
same manner as other disputes parents have over children when parents disagree and the court
determines what is in the best interest of the child.
N. IN ARIZONA, THE COURT ALLOWED PARENTS TO SUE A CLINIC FOR
LOSS OF FIVE EMBRYOS UNDER THEORIES OF BREACH OF A BAILMENT
CONTRACT, BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY, AND NEGLIGENT LOSS OR
DESTRUCTION OF PRE-EMBRYOS, BUT NOT FOR WRONGFUL DEATH.
The Arizona court looked at other state precedent, and the lack of an Arizona Legislative
determination about a conception outside the womb of a “three day old 8- cell pre-embryo” was
not a person, and based on “statutory construction, the status of scientific knowledge concerning
embryonic development, the ongoing discussion concerning when life begins, the unintended
consequences that may result” if an embryo was a person and declined to make a judicial
determination that the legislature intended to allow a cause of action under the wrongful death
act for loss of an embryo.260 In further discussing the basis for the court’s opinion, the court
explained that the plaintiff, Jeter was not making a case that the embryo ex-utero can survive,
exist and develop ex-utero, but were claiming the pre-embryos would become viable, if later
implanted in the womb.261 The Jeter court believed expanding the definition of viability to
259
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potential viability would counter Arizona case precedent and legislative intent that would
consider the entity “viable” only when the entity could exist and fully develop to birth outside
the womb.262
Pursuant to Summerfield v. Superior Court, the Arizona court had allowed plaintiffs to
sue for wrongful death in a malpractice action against a physician for the stillbirth of a thirtyseven week old fetus, holding that under Arizona law a “viable fetus” was encompassed in the
word “person” for purposes of the wrongful death act.263 Subsequently, the Arizona legislature
did not amend the wrongful death statute to include application to a non-viable fetus or
cryopreserved three day old embryo. Therefore, the Jeter court concluded the Arizona
legislature approved of limiting recovery under the wrongful death statute to viable fetuses. 264
The Jeter court reviewed multiple references and recited its understanding of the
scientific facts of embryonic development including the following:
Traditionally an egg is fertilized by the combining of an egg and a sperm, which
are collectively referred to as gametes. Once an egg is fertilized, whether in vivo or
in vitro, it can be referred to as a one-cell zygote. After two to three days of division,
the cells are blastomeres. At that time, the pre-embryo consists of eight cells, all of
which are totipotent, meaning that any of the cells could develop into any type of
tissue and could theoretically develop into eight separate fetuses. At four to six
days, it is .1 millimeter in diameter, at which time the cells begin to separate and
migrate.
If growth proceeds normally, the outer cells will eventually become the placenta
and tissue supporting the fetus while the inner cells, called the inner cell mass, will
become the fetus. At five to six days of development, it is called a blastocyst and
consists of a hollow ball of approximately 100 cells. These cells are pluripotent,
meaning that they have started to specialize but can still develop into various types
of tissue. Scientists are still learning how the cells function at this point of
development.
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By the ninth or tenth day, if in vivo and if it has continued to develop, the
blastocyst will implant in the uterine wall. At day fourteen, a critical development
occurs-the creation of the primitive streak with three layers of specialized cells
that will develop into all the fetus' tissues and cells if development continues. At
this point it has approximately 2000 cells; the groove or middle line reflects a
head-tail and left-right orientation. By day 22 of normal development, the heart
begins to beat, and, by day 40, some body parts are recognizable in primitive
form. At eight weeks, if it has continued to develop, most of the organ systems
have appeared.
As noted above, the occurrence of each of these events depends on the ability of
the organism to continue to develop. This is problematic because the percentage
of pre-embryos that develop into a fetus and a live birth is not high, regardless
whether it is developing in vivo or in vitro, but it is significantly lower for
cryopreserved pre-embryos. The President's Council on Bioethics has estimated
that, in 2001, only 32.8% of assisted reproductive technology fertilized organisms
developed into a pregnancy if not cryopreserved. Only 27% led to live births.
For cryopreserved pre-embryos, only 65% survived thawing and only 20.3% led
to live births. Moreover, in 2001, 72% of all assisted reproductive technology
transfers failed to lead to a birth.265
The Jeter court’s report of the scientific facts, in 2005, does not recognize as reported,
infra, in this paper, that cells within the embryo at a one cell stage may already be forming the
body axis, and by day three of development each of the cells within the embryo are already
executing their own programs for the development of the organism. The scientific fact report by
the Jeter court notes statistics about the low percentage of eventual live births due to the low
percentage of survival of unborn human life as reported for ex-utero human life. The Jeter court
indicated the fact that many variables may affect whether an embryo is born makes it speculative
to conclude in a wrongful death action that “but for the injury” to the “fertilized egg” a child
would have been born and therefore entitled to bring a lawsuit for the injury. 266 Thus, for
purposes of considering an embryo a person under the wrongful death act, the fact proving
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causation of death by another would be speculative due to the high risk of death already present
in the embryo, was a reason listed to support the Jeter court’s conclusion not to consider the exutero embryo a person under the Arizona wrongful death statute.267
The Jeter court also expressed a concern that considering an embryo a person under the
wrongful death statute could have the unintended consequence of making clinics liable for
wrongful death claims.268 The court then also examined at what stage “society” (consisting of
scientists, philosophers, ethicists and the public on the whole) should consider when human life
begins, and reported on opposing viewpoints, declaring the Arizona legislature is in a better
position than the court to determine if the word “person” in the Arizona wrongful death statute
should include embryos.269 The Jeter court reviewed the societal interests in stem cell
research270 balanced against respect for human life to support its opinion that it was not the duty
of the court to determine if an embryo was protected as a person under the Arizona wrongful
death act.271
The Jeter court emphasized that the court’s conclusion that absent clear legislative
direction the three day old, eight cell pre-embryos are not “persons under the Arizona wrongful
death statute, [and]…does not mean they are property.”272 The Jeter court then cited the Davis
court for the principle that embryos are entitled to “special respect” because of their “potential to
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become persons” and are due varying degrees of respect depending on the issue involved.273 The
Jeter court then went on to elaborate that this holding did not deny all causes of action for the
loss of embryos and upheld the claims for negligent loss or destruction of the pre-embryos,
breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of bailment contract.274
O. TEXAS COURT WAS NOT ASKED TO DETERMINE IF EMBRYOS WERE
“JOINT PROPERTY” AND FOLLOWED CONTRACT LAW, EVEN THOUGH
THE COURT RECOGNIZED EMBRYOS ARE DISTINCT FROM CHATTLES,
REAL ESTATE AND MONEY IN ROMAN v. ROMAN.
In Roman v. Roman, the embryo agreement at issue referred to the embryos as “joint
property” and because it was not necessary to the disposition of the appeal, the court did not
address characterization of the embryos as “joint property.”275 The wife in Roman challenged
the validity of a signed embryo storage agreement indicating in the event of divorce, the embryos
were to be discarded.276 The Roman court reviewed the three resolution approaches have been
used: (1) best interest of the child; (2) a contractual approach and (3) a contemporaneous mutual
consent model.277 The court noted that embryos were fundamentally distinct from chattels, real
estate, and money which are the subjects of ante prenuptial agreements.278
Next, the Roman court reviewed its state law on assisted reproduction and gestational
agreements contained within the Uniform Parentage Act and found no directive on determining
embryo disposition in a divorce.279 Then, the Roman court viewed other state law on gestational
agreements and gleaned from Texas law that there was no public policy against deciding the
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disposition of frozen embryos in the event such as divorce, death, or changed circumstances.280
The Roman court then analyzed the embryo agreement under contract law principles.281
The progenitors did not dispute the pages in the agreement were initialed and signed and that in
the event of divorce the embryos were to be discarded.282 The wife claimed she did not
understand the agreement to apply until after she had a successful implantation, but the court
held the language was clear.283 The wife raised the argument that the husband “breached the
intent and purpose of the IVF agreements,” but did not cite authority or argument for that
position, so it was not considered.284 The wife also argued her husband deceived her as to his
true state of mind, so there was no meeting of the minds, but the court found that parole evidence
did not replace the unambiguous written contract language.285 The wife also argued the
agreement was moot because the center agreed to do whatever the court ordered it to do, but
cited no authority for that argument and it was denied.286 The agreement in effect at the time of
the divorce controlled, and the court ordered the embryos discarded.287
The Roman case is another example that a description of embryos as “joint property”
results in progenitors being informed embryos can be thrown away and courts based on contract
law analysis order termination of innocent human life, even when a parent claims the contract
was not understood and wants the embryo to grow and develop. The wife in Roman did not
provide the court with authority that she was denied her unalienable rights to care for the health
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of her offspring and her pursuit of happiness to care for the life created and to have the
companionship of the created life.
P. WITHOUT SCIENTIFIC ANALYSIS OF THE NATURE OF THE EMBRYOS,
OR ARGUMENT THE AGREEMENT WAS INVALID, THE OREGON COURT
FOUND EMBRYOS DEFINED IN A CLINC AGREEMENT AS PERSONAL
PROPERTY, ALSO MET THE BROAD DEFINITION OF PROPERTY UNDER
OREGON LAW IN DAHL v. ANGLE.
In Dahl v. Angle, the father in an embryo property settlement dispute stated “there is no
pain greater than having participated in the demise of your own child.”288 In describing the
subjects of the dispute, the court noted that the agreement of the parties in the appendix defined
the embryos as cleaving embryos, as distinguished from zygotes and blastocysts and there was
no trial evidence regarding the embryos’ stage of development.289 The Dahl court ruled that a
contractual right to dispose of embryos created during a marriage constitutes personal property
under Oregon law and is subject to the court’s authority to distribute embryos in a subsequent
dissolution proceeding.290 Secondly, the court held it had the authority to distribute the embryos
in a manner of distribution of that property that is “just and proper in all circumstances.”291
In reaching the decision, the Dahl court reviewed the language in the storage agreement
between the University and the “clients” that labeled the embryos as personal property and that
the “clients represent and warrant they have lawful possession of and the legal right and
authority to store the embryos under the terms of this agreement.”292 The court determined
pursuant to the case of In Re Marriage of Massee,293 that the definition of property as something
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“[t]hat is or may be owned or possessed, or the exclusive right to possess, use, enjoy or dispose
of a thing” was a definition broad enough to apply to embryos.294 Dahl accepted the resolution
framework set forth by Davis, as consistent with Oregon law that gave effect to prenuptial
agreements, and state policy enforcing marital agreements.295
While the agreement did not address disposition in the event of marital dissolution or
separation, it did contemplate the contingency of who had the primary authority as decision
maker if the parties disagreed and the agreement stated the wife was the decision maker.296 At
the trial court level, the husband denied he ever initialed or read the agreement and stated he
signed only the last page without a notary present; however, the trial court found the husband
was not untruthful, but had an inaccurate recollection.297 The validity of the contract was not
challenged further. On appeal, the husband did not argue the agreement was ambiguous or
invalid for public policy reasons.298
Thus, the appellate court in Dahl did not honor the husband’s request to balance his
“belief” that the embryos are life and his desire to donate the embryos in a way to allow “his
offspring to develop their full potential as human beings” should outweigh the wife’s interest in
avoiding genetic parenthood.299 On appeal, the court did not find the trial court had abused its
discretion in determining to give effect to the embryo disposition agreement.300
The confusion regarding the legal status of the embryo may have led the husband in Dahl
to argue a just and proper distribution of “property” applied to embryos pursuant to Oregon

294

Dahl, 194 P.3d at 838.
Id. at 840.
296
Id.
297
Id. at 837.
298
Id. at 841.
299
Id.
300
Id.
295

61

marital dissolution laws, although to him, the embryos were “living things” he did not want
killed; and the wife, who wanted the embryos destroyed argued that the embryos were not
“property” subject to a distribution of marital property, but if they were, then the court could not
impose a genetic parental relationship.301 Perhaps, the father reasoned the best chance to save
the embryos was to have them classified as property in hope a fair and just distribution of
property in divorce would give the embryos a chance at continued life, while the mother who
wished for no action to be taken to preserve the lives of the offspring argued against a property
status. Factually, it is important to note that the progenitors already establish genetic parenthood
and not the courts, and therefore the courts in balancing rights, should accurately define the
rights to be weighed.
Q. IN FLORIDA, CASE LAW DID NOT ADDRESS THE NATURE OF THE
EMBRYO, BUT ONLY PARTY RIGHTS PURUSANT TO SETTLEMENT
ENFORCEMENT IN VITAKIS V. VALCHINE.
In Vitakis v. Valchine, the parties, a divorcing husband and wife, saw a mediator, and the
wife had claimed she entered her divorce mediation agreement under duress and coercion.302
Part of the settlement agreement was for the wife to “provide” the couple’s frozen embryos to
the husband so he could dispose of them, and further that the divorce agreement could only be
modified by written agreement.303 The appellate court had first remanded the case to the trial
court that found no mediator misconduct, or duress or coercion and upheld the settlement
agreement.304 After the ruling that the settlement agreement was enforceable, the husband filed
a motion to force the wife to provide the embryos to him.305 The wife argued that during the
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pendency of the appeals her husband had a “change of heart” granting her the embryos, but she
had nothing in writing modifying the agreement.306 Thus, the court on appeal affirmed that the
settlement agreement was valid.307
Florida statutory law refers to the nature of the embryo as a pre-embryo.308 In Vitakis v.
Valchine, there was no mention of any party challenging the nature of the embryo, so the
humanity of the embryo and the constitutional rights of a parent to protect offspring was not
raised by this decision. Further, as explained in this article, “preembryo” was a term that the
Davis court adopted from the American Fertility Society that had believed there was no cellular
differentiation in the early developing embryo until implantation. As discussed in the article,
the label of “pre-embryo” is not a scientific term that actually describes the composition and the
behavior of the early human embryo based on what is known about the early human embryo in
2018.
R. ILLINOIS HOLDS ITS WRONGFUL DEATH ACT IS IN DEROGATION OF
THE COMMON LAW AND MUST BE STRICLTY CONSTRUED, AND,
THEREFORE, ONLY THE LEGISLATURE CAN DETERMINE IF THERE IS
RECOVERY FOR LOSS OF AN UNIMPLANTED EMBRYO.
The Illinois Wrongful Death Act permits recovery for death of a person.309 The law
provides that the “state of gestation or development of a human being” when the injury is
caused would not prohibit a cause of action.310 The term “human being” was not defined in the
Wrongful Death Act, so the court looked to legislative history.311 The legislative history did not
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mention in vitro fertilization embryos.312 The court found the purpose of Section 2.2 was to
extend a cause of action to pregnancies in the mother’s body regardless of whether the fetus was
viable or nonviable and therefore refused to extend the statute to apply to embryos created by in
vitro fertilization that were not implanted in the mother.313 The court further pronounced that
the language “the state of gestation” refers to the in utero fetus and “the stage of development”
refers to the live born fetus.314
The Illinois Court had not addressed the fact that the culture medium in which the
embryos are stored acts like an artificial womb and that the growth and development of
embryos are factually observed in the culture medium.
S. IN ARKANSAS, A CLINIC DISPOSITION STATEMENT GIVING THE
CLINIC CONTROL AND DIRECTION OF TISSUES IN THE EVENT OF A
DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE PREVAILED OVER THE WIFE’S
OBJECTION CLAIMING THE HUSBAND HAD AGREED IN A MARITAL
PROPERTY SETTLEMENT THAT SHE COULD DECIDE EMBRYO
DISPOSITION.
In Dodson v. Univ. of Ark. for Med. Sciences, the Federal Court ruled that the Arkansas
state court had applied state law and upheld pre-IVF agreement that a university would take
control of couple’s frozen pre-embryos in the case of divorce, and that the federal courts were
barred from revisiting that holding under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which claims federal
district courts generally lack subject matter jurisdiction over attempted appeals from state court
judgment.315 A review of the facts in the underlying state case reveals that the clinic described
the embryos to the husband and wife as “tissue” and the court believed biological parenthood
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did not begin until after birth.316 The facts also indicate the dispute was initially attempted to be
resolved in a marital property settlement.317
The plaintiffs, Dodson, the wife, and her husband, Lay, had eighteen cryopreserved
embryos in storage at the University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences (UAMS).318 The UAMS
had a disposition statement, which indicated that in the event of martial dissolution by court
order then “all control and direction of [their] tissues will be relinquished to the medical
director.”319 The UAMS had acknowledged that Dodson and Lay would control and direct
disposition of the tissues.320 Further, at any time prior to implantation in Dodson’s uterus the
couple or surviving spouse could have the tissues destroyed, used for medical research, or
transferred to the custody of another physician at another health care facility. 321
During 1997 divorce proceedings the court affirmed a property settlement where the
terms of the UAMS disposition statement were affirmed, but in addition it was decreed Dodson
“shall have the right to choose from available options, if any, for disposition listed in the
[Disposition Statement].”322 Subsequently, in 1999, Dobson requested UAMS transfer the
embryos to her, but UAMS would not do so without Lay’s consent.323 Lay only consented to
the three options in the disposition statement, but did not consent to transfer to Dobson for
implantation.324 Dobson sought relief in chancery court that determined the UAMS disposition
statement was in control and UAMS who was not a party and the chancery court stated it would

316

Id. at 751, 753.
Id. at 752.
318
Id.
319
Id.
320
Id.
321
Id.
322
Id.
323
Id.
324
Id.
317

65

not interpret a third party contract.325
Subsequently, UAMS offered Dobson twenty-one days in which to exercise one of the
three options in the disposition statement.326 Dodson filed a declaratory judgment action against
UAMS, the UAMS Chancellor, the IVF Program Director, and later substituted in the UAMS
Board of Trustees for the Chancellor and the Director.327
Dodson alleged that her ex-husband had relinquished his right to consent or object to the
implantation of certain embryos into her, and secondly that she had fulfilled her rights and
obligations to UAMS.328 Third, plaintiff alleged UAMS must fulfill its obligation to her and
implant the embryos.329 Fourth, Dodson requested a preliminary injunction prohibiting UAMS
from disposing or injuring the embryos until a final hearing on the merits.330
The court denied the cause of action explaining that Dodson along with Lay had agreed
to let the IVF Program control the embryos in the event of a divorce and the Director was
reasonable in giving Dodson three of the previous agreed dispositions to select.331 The court
further found that it was reasonable for the program Director to request the ex-husband’s
consent “to become a biological father.”332 Dobson appealed the ruling to the Arkansas
Supreme Court, but her case was dismissed because she failed to order a transcript of the
chancery court proceedings.333
The Dodson case is another example of a clinic drafted disposition of an embryo
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agreement trumping the rights of a parent to protect offspring by not recognizing the offspring
as a human being but referring to the procreated embryo as tissue. While clinic documents
defining rights of the parties may be essential to clinic functions, the clinics need to accurately
state that who is being created is not mere cells and tissue, but an identifiable human organism,
who is distinguishable from all other human organisms, in accordance with currently known and
observed biological facts.
T. FEDERAL COURT DENIES A CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT THAT DID
NOT NAME THE PLAINTIFF’S “PARTICULARIZED CHARACTERISTICS”
IN DOE v. OBAMA.
In Doe v. Obama, Mary Scott Doe, a human embryo on behalf of other embryos in
storage and potential adoptive parents sought in the trial court to block federally funded research
on human embryonic stem cells as violating the embryos Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights, and the Dickey Wicker Amendment prohibiting federal funds for destruction of human
embryos.334 The Fourth Circuit found that the progenitor/parents of the embryos were the ones
who caused the embryos to be donated for research and there was no evidence that it was the
executive order permitting research that caused harm to the embryos.335 The court noted that
Mary Scott Doe could have been placed for adoption by her parents and there was no proof she
was harmed.336 The trial court found that the allegations were to an “amorphous frozen embryo
class” and parents who may want to adopt in the future.337 The court found this case at least
acknowledged that a complaint might have described particular characteristics and harm done to
particular embryos. The court’s “conclusion that plaintiffs cannot establish standing in this case
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is a narrow one, for [it] do[es] not suggest that no party would ever have standing to assert
similar claims.”338 Further, “[t]he bar of standing must not be set too high, lest many regulatory
actions escape review contrary to the intent of Congress.”339 The court indicated that “[a]
complaint that provided more concrete information about the identity of the named plaintiff
embryo or the plaintiff parents' plans for adoption would at least address more directly what the
Supreme Court has identified as serious constitutional concerns.”340
Note that embryos belonging to specific couples in divorce cases can be identified and
likely have documentation in a medical record describing the developmental stage and
appearance of each embryo. The rights of parents to protect their particular embryos and to
bring a cause of action to protect them is in accordance with the spirit of the Declaration of
Independence and the many state constitutions that protect inalienable rights and that recognizes
that we were each created with endowed inalienable rights and the job of government is to
protect those rights.
U. THE OHIO COURT CLAIMED A FATHER FAILED TO CITE ANY
AUTHORITY TO SUPPORT THE CLAIM THAT THE THIRTEENTH
AMENDMENT APPLIES TO FROZEN EMBRYOS, AND UPHELD
ENFORCEMENT OF A CLINIC DOCUMENT DEFINING THE EMBRYOS AS
PROPERTY AND GIVING DISPOSTION TO THE WIFE AFTER DIVORCE AS
PREVIOUSLY AGREED IN THE SIGNED CLINIC DOCUMENT IN CWIK V.
CWIK.
In Cwik v. Cwik under a heading marked by the court as “III. Property Issues, A. Frozen
Embryos,” the court reported that the father argued that it would be in the best interest of the
embryos that he be granted custody of the embryos because he would hire a surrogate to give
birth to the embryos, but the trial court had upheld an informed consent document that he has
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signed earlier declaring the embryos were the sole property of his wife.341 While the court noted
that he had cited the Thirteenth Amendment in support of his argument that the clinic contract
was unconstitutional, the court stated he failed to cite any authority to support this claim.342
Instead, the court referenced Doe v. Obama, for the proposition that courts have not afforded
frozen embryos legally protected interests akin to persons, so embryos would not be persons
under the Thirteenth Amendment.343
Secondly, the husband argued that the clinic document was unconscionable and should
not be upheld.344 The Ohio Court referenced Karmasu v. Karmasu,345 which held a trial court
“had no authority or jurisdiction to interfere in a contract made between the parties herein and a
third party, which was not a party to the divorce action.”346 Thus, the Ohio court found there
was no abuse of discretion in the trial court awarding the embryos to the mother pursuant to the
signed contract.347
Note, the decision in Doe v. Obama, supra, did not specifically address the merits of the
class of embryos claims under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment because the court
found specific characteristics of the embryos and the harm suffered were not described to
indicate there was standing for an actual case or controversy because the only embryos
researched on would be embryos whose parents consented to donate them to research. The court
never considered the logic that no human being has been classified as property since the
Thirteenth Amendment was ratified in 1865 and to treat human beings as property is contrary to
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the Thirteenth Amendment, particularly when balanced against parental constitutional rights to
protect their begotten offspring.
V. NEITHER PARENT CHALLENGED THE PROPERTY
CHARACTERIZATION OF THE EMBRYOS, YET PENNSYLVANIA COURT
RAISES ISSUE OF WHEN PROCREATION OCCURS IN PURPOSEFULLY
CREATING EMBRYOS, AND DISTINGUISHES BETWEEN AGREEMENTS
BETWEEN EACH PARENT AND AGREEMENTS BETWEEN CLINICS AND
PARENTS IN REBER v. REISS.
In Reber v. Reiss, the Superior Court analyzed the form entitled “Informed Consent for
Cryopreservation and Storage of Embryos.”348 The form gave the husband and wife the
opportunity to indicate what the fate of the embryos would be in the event of their divorce, but
neither party completed that portion of the consent form.349 The second page of the form stated
in pertinent part, “[m]aximum duration of embryos storage for each group or partial group of
embryos is not to exceed three years.”350 The contract also provided the facility would send
notice of intent to destroy the pre-embryos via certified mail when it came time to destroy
them.351
In 2006, the husband filed for divorce.352 He claimed he just created the embryos as a
“safeguard” and did not intend to have a child with his wife.353 After the husband filed for
divorce he went on to purposefully have a biological child with another woman and indicated he
planned to have more children.354
The wife, in contrast, had undergone extensive cancer treatment including two surgeries,
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eight rounds of chemotherapy and thirty-seven rounds of radiation and during the divorce
hearing and testified that her physicians led her to believe she was unable to now conceive.355
The Superior Court supported the Master and Trial Court’s finding that the “safeguard” was to
guard against the very situation where wife could not have a biological child.356 The Court
determined the husband voluntarily provided wife with sperm when wife’s doctors
recommended IVF treatment to preserve her fertility.357 The Court found clearly the husband
knew his participation in IVF was going to result in a child at some point in the future and that
the only reason one undergoes IVF is to have a child.358 The Court found the agreement made
between husband and wife for use of the pre-embryos was not contingent on the parties
remaining married and when given the opportunity to indicate on the form the fate of the
embryos in the event of divorce, neither party completed that section.359
The husband also argued that the trial court should have enforced the provision in the
consent form that the embryos would be destroyed after three years.360 The Superior Court
found that the duration section of the signed agreement was between the husband and wife and
the storage facility about the destruction of the pre-embryos and it was not an agreement between
the husband and wife that the embryos be destroyed if they became divorced.361 The Court
stated the contract also provided the clinic would send notice of intent to destroy the preembryos via certified mail when it came time to destroy them. Husband and wife both testified
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they had not received notice of destruction.362
The husband argued he was being forced to procreate against his will.363 The Superior
Court, however, agreed with the trial court that Pennsylvania public policy is silent on the issue
of forced procreation under these circumstances.364 However, other states have adopted policies.
In Texas, “[t]he consent of a former spouse to assisted reproduction may be withdrawn by that
individual in a record kept by a licensed physician at any time before placement of eggs, sperm
or embryos.365 In Florida, absent a written agreement, the decision making authority resides
jointly with the couple.366 The trial court offered the following analysis about the weight of the
forced procreation argument:
We believe that Husband implicitly agreed to procreate with Wife when he agreed
to undergo IVF, signed the consent form, provided sperm for the creation of the
pre-embryos and agreed to the fertilization causing the pre-embryos to be created.
The use of the pre-embryos was never made contingent upon the parties being
married. In fact, when provided the opportunity to resolve the fate of the preembryos in the event of divorce neither party completed that portion of the IVF
form.367
Given the court did not find a valid contract; the rights of the parties were balanced.368
Neither party disputed that the court could treat the pre-embryos as marital property.369 In
weighing the husband’s interest against unwanted procreation, the Court found Pennsylvania law
silent on the issue of forced procreation under the circumstances before it and found husband had
not made his voluntary decision to let the pre-embryos be created contingent on remaining
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married.370 The wife testified that the husband would not need to be concerned that his child
would not know his biological father, as the wife would allow him to be involved in the child’s
life if he desired.371
The husband was concerned about his financial duty of support.372 The wife’s counsel
reported extensively about how she would not look to the husband for financial support.373
Given the wife’s testimony that she would not seek financial support from the husband, the court
left open the right to determine if the issue of financial support was an actual case or
controversy.374 The husband’s financial concerns were considered in light of wife’s agreement
to do her best to assure that the husband never has to pay child support.375 The Superior Court
concluded that:
In this case, because the Husband and Wife never made an agreement prior to
undergoing IVF, and these pre-embryos are likely the Wife’s only opportunity to
achieve biological parenthood and her best chance to achieve parenthood at all, we
agree with the trial court that the balancing of interests tips in the Wife’s favor.376
The Reber court did not recognize that the true balancing test was the wife’s right to
provide care for her offspring and pursue the happiness of the care and companionship of her
offspring versus the husband’s right to terminate his parental duties and responsibilities to the
offspring created by having the life he created terminated.
W. EVIDENCE THAT A MALE PROGENITOR AGREED WITH THE FEMALE
PROGENITOR THAT SHE COULD HAVE THE EMBRYOS CREATED, AND
LACK OF EVIDENCE THAT LEGAL PARENTHOOD WAS FORCED ON THE
MALE PROGENITOR RESULTED IN THE ILLINOIS COURT HONORING
THE VERBAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN PROGENITORS PRIOR TO
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CREATION OF THE EMBRYOS IN SZARFRANSKI V. DUNSTON.
In Szarfranski v. Dunston, the appellate court reviewed a case that was remanded to
determine if there was an advance agreement between an unmarried couple as to the embryos
disposition and if not, to weigh the parties relative interests.377 At issue was a clinic document
stating: “Embryos are understood to be your property with rights of survivorship. No use can be
made of these embryos without consent of both parties.”378 The trial and appellate court did not
find the clinic document countered a prior oral agreement by Szarfranski to allow Dunston to
have her eggs fertilized with his sperm to create a child.379 Nonetheless, the court also balanced
the interest of the parties and the appellate court affirmed Dunston would be given the embryos
and that the “pre-embryos” represent Karla’s last and only opportunity to have a biological
child.380 Justice Harris, dissenting, reported there was “genuine and understandable sympathy
for the predicament of one of the parties” and that parties “contemplating issues with significant
implications such as creating and bringing a child into the world, that they make their intentions
regarding material concerns clearly known. . . .”381 Neither the court, nor the dissenting Justice,
mentioned any sympathy for the life created or the justice of leaving human life in storage, or
terminating innocent life, or deciding the fate of human beings on a clinic form that describes
them as property. The case was decided on contract law principles, but the court did not only
look to the clinic consent form for evidence of party agreement prior to creation of the embryos
in determining there was an agreement to procreate.
Currently, in Illinois the test to resolve embryo disputes will be to analyze what the
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agreement was between the parties as to the fate of the created embryos and if no agreement
exists to balance party rights. The court commented that while it was not ruling on his
parenthood status, if the unmarried male progenitor did not want to be a father he had a legal
remedy under Illinois law to be declared a sperm donor.382
X. A CALIFORNIA TRIAL COURT LACKING ADVOCACY THAT THE
SUBJECTS OF A DIVORCE DISPUTE, FROZEN EMBRYOS WERE HUMAN
BEINGS, NONETHELESS FOUND THE EMBRYOS WERE NOT PROPERTY,
BUT, MISTAKENLY BELIEVED HUMAN BEINGS HAD TO BE “FULLY
FORMED” TO HAVE HUMAN RIGHTS AND DID NOT RECOGNIZE THEM
AS CREATED WITH UNALIENABLE RIGHTS, THUS, DECLARING A RIGHT
NOT TO PROCREATE OF THE FATHER PREVENTED THE MOTHER’S
RIGHT TO BEAR HER OFFSPRING.
In In re the Marriage of Stephen E. Findley, Petitioner v. Mimi C. Lee, Respondent, The
Regents of the University of California, there was no advocacy on behalf of the five human
embryos before the trial court, but nonetheless the court held that “[e]mbryos in this case
represent the nascent stage of five human lives. They are not property nor are they a fully formed
human being. They are, in the construct of the law, sui generis and will be deemed as such in
this statement of decision.”383
The court’s holding that human embryos may not be treated as property, is a correct
understanding of observable scientific facts, but the author of this paper submits the court did not
fully understand the nature of the embryos when it concluded that human embryos fall short of
being fully human because they are not “fully formed.” The human embryos chosen for storage
are fully formed human beings in accordance with their stage of development. The court did not
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recognize that no human beings are “fully formed” at any given age, but undergo continuous
change from fertilization to death. A human being develops rapidly initially, but reaches sexual
maturity only in young adulthood, and psychological maturity even later. Changes continue into
old age -- e.g., with age spots and senescence -- until death. The only "fully formed" reality in
this process is the human organism's unique development plan, initiated at fertilization, which
directs each person’s growth from fertilization until death.384
The trial court in Findley recognized that the embryos before it were sui generis
(unique),385 but could not articulate a valid basis for holding that they were less than fully
human. This is not surprising given the lack of any advocacy by the parties (or by anyone else
on behalf of the embryos) for the position that they are fully human beings. Nonetheless, the
trial court in Findley was not presented by the parties with the observed scientific facts about
what a human organism is, an identifiable human being in existence. Therefore, Findley should
not a be considered as legal precedent to deny a parent the right to protect and nurture and care
for their offspring, as even born children are not fully formed, nor is any human being ever fully
formed but always forming until death. The act of procreation by the progenitors was
completed. The female progenitor did not argue that the legal issue was whether the government
through the justice system should protect the human beings created by acting in the embryos best
interest and allow parental care and nurturing so that their created life could continue and did not
urge the court to recognize parental rights to protect their children begin at the moment of spermegg binding. Instead the court mistakenly weighed “procreation rights.”
Y. IN MCQUEEN V. GADBERRY, THE THE MISSOURI COURT CITED 87
ALR5TH 253 THAT CLAIMED THE EMBRYO PROPER OR ACTUAL
EMBRYO DID NOT EXIST UNTIL IMPLANTATION AND DESCRIBED THE
384
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EMBRYO AS “PREEMBRYO”; “HUMAN TISSUE”; “MARITAL PROPERTY
OF A SPECIAL CHARACTER.”
In 2016, two of three justices in McQueen v. Gadberry, upheld the trial court’s decision to
treat the embryos as marital property of a special character, finding property to be an external thing
over which the rights of use are exercised and found the in vitro embryos to be external and human
tissue.386 The majority opinion referenced the Davis case to support that: “…frozen pre-embryos
are unlike traditional forms of property because they are comprised of a woman and man’s genetic
material, are human tissue, and have the potential to become born children “387
The Missouri court also discussed Davis and progeny cases for the idea that each party had
procreational autonomy rights, a right to procreate and a right not to procreate, not recognizing
that the human embryos were already procreated and in a stage of early human development. 388
The resolution model of the Witten Court in Iowa that awarded the embryos jointly to the
parties, was followed by the trial court and upheld by the Missouri Appeals Court.389
The majority opinion that the embryos were ‘tissue” did not acknowledge the observable
scientific facts known in 2016 that a human embryo is a human organism in development prior to
implantation in the womb, but instead referenced 87 A.L.R.5th 253, (originally published in 2001),
reporting:
In this case, there was no evidence introduced at trial with respect to the
science of IVF, related scientific terms, or the division or cell stages of
the frozen pre-embryos at issue in this case. However, it appears the
parties do not dispute the facts or science concerning the stages of
development involved in IVF. As explained in American Law Reports:
. . . Typically, the [IVF] procedure begins with hormonal stimulation of
a woman’s ovaries to produce multiple eggs. The eggs are then removed
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by laparoscopy or ultrasound-directed needle aspiration and placed in a
glass dish, where sperm are introduced. Once a sperm cell fertilizes the
egg, this fusion, or pre-zygote, divides until it reaches the four-to-eight
cell stages, after which several pre-zygotes are transferred to the
woman’s uterus by a cervical catheter. If the procedure succeeds, an
embryo will attach itself to the uterine wall, differentiate, and develop
into a fetus. As an alternative to immediate implantation, pre-zygotes
may be cryopreserved indefinitely in liquid nitrogen for later use. ‘Preembryo’ is a medically accurate term for a zygote or fertilized egg that
has not been implanted in a uterus. It refers to the approximately 14-day
period of development from fertilization to the time when the embryo
implants in the uterine wall and the ‘primitive streak,’ the precursor to
the nervous system, appears. An embryo proper develops only after
implantation. The term ‘frozen embryos’ is a term of art denoting
cryogenically preserved pre-embryos. Elizabeth A. Trainor, Annotation,
Right of Husband, Wife, or Other Party to Custody of Frozen Embryo,
Preembryo, or Pre-zygote in Event of Divorce, Death, or Other
Circumstances, 87 A.L.R.5th 253 (originally published in 2001).390
In McQueen, the dissenting justice, James Dowd, indicated that the declaration of Missouri
law in subsection 1.205, 188.010 and 188.0155 supported the fact that life begins at conception,
including every stage of biological development, conceptus, zygote, morula, blastocyst, embryo
and fetus; and that conception is defined as the fertilization of the ovum of a female by the sperm
of a male.391 The dissent pointed out there was no classification of “marital property of a special
character” in Missouri law and no Supreme Court decision that justifies the finding that the
embryos are property.392 Justice Dowd stated that the Thirteenth Amendment removes all human
beings from the category of property.393
It is incredulous to the author of this paper that the two majority justices in McQueen can
claim there was no dispute between the parties as to the facts or science regarding the
developmental stages involved in IVF, when there is a scientific difference between property such

390

Id. at 133, n.4.
Id. at 158-59.
392
Id. at 158.
393
Id.
391

78

as cells and tissue compared to human organisms, human offspring, identifiable human beings
distinguishable from parents and sibling embryos as well as born siblings. The father was arguing
he had procreation rights at issue and yet, procreation rights were already exercised producing four
human beings.394 The created offspring included the two cryopreserved siblings and the couple’s
two other children, who were all created at the same time, and cryopreserved at one of the
biological stages of development as identified by Missouri law Sections 188.010 and 188.015(3)
and (10).395 Despite the fact that it is known today that the origins of the human body begin prior
to implantation in the uterus, and that the inner cell mass visualized in the embryos at the blastocyst
stage of development is desired for embryonic stem cell research, the Missouri court majority
opinion was referencing old scientific thought that the “embryo proper” developed after
implantation which is not consistent with current scientific findings.396
The Missouri Supreme Court denied appeal. The mother announced in a tearful YouTube
video that she had reached an agreement with her ex-husband that the embryos will be adopted,
and she wanted to assure their continued life rather than have the United States Supreme Court
decide their fate, so she was not appealing the case further.397
Z. IN LOEB v. VERGARA, PETIONER-FATHER SEEKING CUSTODY OF
HIS EMBRYOS WAS ORDERED TO IDENTIFY WHOM HE FATHERED
CHILDREN WITH IN THE PAST AND WHO HAD ABORTIONS,
RESULTING IN THE PETITIONER FATHER ABANDONING HIS
CALIFORNIA LAWSUIT.
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Petitioner Loeb’s contention was that he is the "father" of the female embryos before the
Court, whom he views as “his daughters,” and that the “Female Embryos have been
conceived.”398 Loeb and Vergara’s plan was to transfer the embryos to a surrogate mother’s
uterus. At some point the embryos were cryopreserved. Later the parties separated, and
disagreed over disposition of their embryos, prompting the lawsuit.399
Press releases revealed that Respondent, Vergara wanted the embryos to remain
cryopreserved until either she or Loeb died, at which time the embryos would be thawed “with no
action taken,” meaning they would not be given the opportunity for further cell metabolism and
would die.400
Loeb sought custody of the embryos, so he could find a surrogate mother to bear them.401
The parents never intended that Vergara would physically bear the embryos, so a mother’s right
to choose to bear, or not to bear, a child was not implicated.402
According to the complaint, the parties in the informed consent forms they executed to
engage the IVF clinic’s services never provided a directive for disposition in the event of their
separation, only a directive for disposition in the event of their death (“thaw with no action”).403
Loeb further asserted that assigning a disposition upon one event (death) does not govern
disposition upon a different, uncontemplated event (separation).404 He asserted that he would not
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have selected the disposition (thaw with no action) if he had an inkling that it might be enforced
in the event of his and Vergara’s separation.405 He also asserted that he signed the form under
duress.406 Finally, Loeb claimed that the clinic forms are void because they do not list all the
options, including “donation to another couple” or “other disposition” that the California Code
requires.407 Loeb requested the court to find that the forms he and Vergara executed were invalid
and to award him custody of the embryos.408
During the discovery phase of litigation, the Petitioner, Loeb was ordered by the court, to
identify women with whom he had fathered children in the past who subsequently had abortions.409
The Petitioner stated he would rather go to jail than identify the women who had aborted his prior
children.410 On December 6, 2016, he dismissed his California lawsuit. Then on December 7,
2016 he brought a lawsuit on behalf of his cryopreserved daughters, whom he named Emma and
Isabella in the state of Louisiana.411
AA.THE HUMAN EMBRYOS DID NOT HAVE A CASE TO PRESENT IN
THE STATE OF LOUISIANA WHERE THE COURT LACKED
PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER THE MOTHER.
In Human Embryo #4 HB-A v. Vergara, Loeb, the father and Plaintiff, filed a lawsuit on
behalf of his embryonic daughters, Emma and Isabella, in a state where embryos are judicial
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people who have the right to sue and be sued and cannot be intentionally destroyed.412 Loeb had
created a Louisiana Trust in 2016 to benefit Isabella and Emma if they were born alive.
Plaintiff’s sought:

412
413

(1)

A declaratory judgment declaring that the Form Directive is a void and
unenforceable contract between Loeb and Vergara under California law because it
does not contain certain required provisions pertaining to the deposition of the preembryos under certain circumstances;

(2)

A declaratory judgment declaring that the Form Directive does not control
decisions regarding the future disposition of Emma and Isabella in the event of
Loeb and Vergara’s separation because it lacks such provisions, which are required
by California law.

(3)

Rescission of the Form Directive because Loeb signed it under duress;

(4)

Rescission of the General Informed Consent as against public policy and Louisiana
law because it declares that the pre-embryos are property instead of people;

(5)

Rescission of the Form Directive for fraud and misrepresentation because, at the
time the pre-embryos were created through the IVF process, Loeb was relying on
Vergara’s representations that she wanted them to be transferred to a surrogate;

(6)

Declaratory judgment prohibiting Vergara from consenting to the pre-embryos’
destruction;

(7)

Declaratory judgment mandating that Vergara release the pre-embryos for uterine
transfer;

(8)

Finding a breach of an oral contract between Loeb and Vergara to have the preembryos transferred to a surrogate which has prevented them from being born and
gaining their inheritance in the Trust;

(9)

Finding of tortious interference with the pre-embryos’ ability to inherit from the
Trust by not permitting them to be transferred to a surrogate;

(10)

Appointment of Loeb as the pre-embryos’ curator;

(11)

An order declaring Vergara to be an egg donor under California law; and

(12)

An order terminating Vergara’s parental rights.413
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The court did not proceed with the case, however, because it found there was not personal
jurisdiction over the mother, Vergara, as the cause of action that was alleged in the complaint did
not arise out of the mother’s contacts with Louisiana and she did not otherwise have enough
minimum contacts with the state of Louisiana to invoke jurisdiction.414
BB. ROOK V. ROOKS HELD THAT A FATHER HAD A RIGHT NOT TO
“PROCREATE” EVEN THOUGH HE ACKNOWLEGED HE WAS THE
“BIOLOGICAL PARENT’ AND THE TRIAL COURT ACKNOWLEGED
THAT THE EMBRYOS WERE BIOLOGICALLY AND SCIENTIFICALLY
LIFE
The parties, Respondent-Appellant Mandy Rooks and Petitioner-Appellee Drake Rooks,
while married, used in-vitro fertilization (IVF) to have three children and they also have six
additional embryos in storage that were created.415 The father then petitioned for divorce.416 He
asked the court to deliver the six embryos to him for discard.417

The mother seeks their

preservation for future implantation.418
The trial court awarded the embryos to the father, finding them to be property disposable
under terms of the parties' IVF agreement.419 The trial court alternatively balanced the mother's
desire for additional children against the father's desire not to continue to be the embryos' father.420
The court found the father enjoyed a “negative right” to avoid further burdens of genetic
parenthood and decided that the right outweighed the mother's interest in preserving the
embryos.421
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The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s judgment under a “balancing of interest
approach.”422

Because no Colorado statute or appellate decision addresses disposition of

cryopreserved embryos on dissolution of marriage the appellate court looked for persuasive
guidance to decisions of other jurisdictions.423 The Appellate Court concurred with courts
adopting a contract approach which enforces a valid agreement of the spouses, and absent
agreement, balances the spouses' respective interests.424

Here the court, finding no valid

agreement, balanced the Rooks' interests.425
In doing so, the appellate court considered the seminal case of Davis v. Davis, and its
progeny. The appellate court held that the trial court could reasonably conclude that the husband’s
interest in not producing additional offspring outweighed the wife’s interest in having a fourth child,
citing Davis, and that the husband had a constitutional right “to determine that he does not want to
have additional children who are joint genetic offspring of husband and wife,” again citing Davis.426
Petitioner basically acknowledged the scientific recognition that he created human life
when he illogically argued that “biological parents’ have the right not to become parents . . . .”427
This admits he is the biological parent of the embryos before the court. The court itself found that
the embryos are “biologically and scientifically ‘life.’”428 (R.CF., p. 232). However, it decided it
could not hold that the embryos had rights as human persons because Colorado does not count
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unborn children as persons under its criminal laws, child dependency and neglect laws, and
wrongful death statute.429
The Supreme Court of Colorado granted certiorari on April 17, 2017, on two issues:
1. Whether, in the absence of an agreement between the parties, the court of
appeals erred in its adoption of the balance of interests approach to determine
the disposition of the parties’ cryogenically frozen pre-embryos in a
dissolution of marriage.
2. Whether the court of appeals erred in applying an abuse of discretion standard
of review in reviewing the trial court’s determination of the disposition of a
couple’s cryogenically frozen pre-embryos in a dissolution of marriage.430
The decision of the Colorado Supreme Court in this case is pending.
CC. IN KARUNGI V. EJALU, BY THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE
AGREEMENT “ANY AND ALL DISPUTES RELATAING TO THIS
AGREEMENT OR ITS BREACH SHALL BE SETTLED BY
ARBITRATION.”
In Karungi v. Ejalu, the clinic agreement with the parties provided that by “any and all
disputes relating to this agreement or its breach shall be settled by arbitration.” 431 Two of three
Michigan justices remanded the case back to the trial court for further consideration of the
applicability of the arbitration clause as to whether the court had subject matter jurisdiction to
decide the case.432
The dissenting justice disagreed that the arbitration applied to disagreements between the
parties and thought the arbitration clause only applied to any disagreement between the clinic and
the parties.433 According to the dissenting justice, there was no Michigan law to support the
proposition that frozen embryos are persons subject to a custody determination, so the dissenting
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justice would have granted a summary disposition on the basis the court lacked legal authority to
consider the disposition of embryos in the context of a custody case.434
The concurring opinion thought the majority opinion only decided that the trial court’s
reasoning that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction because it was captioned as a child support
dispute rather than a custody dispute was misplaced.435 The concurring opinion thought it was
proper to remand to the trial court for further proceedings and not for anything more.436
The justice that wrote the majority opinion thought the parties and the trial court both
ignored the clinic contract where the embryos were defined as joint property of both the recipient
and partner who were deemed to be the legal owners.437 The majority opinion also commented
that according to the parties’ agreement with the clinic that stored the embryos, any disputes
regarding the agreement or its breach would be settled by arbitration and that the trial court should
have considered this case a contract dispute.438 The opinion stated a family support court would
also have original jurisdictions in other matters and would not be precluded from resolving the
contract issue.439 The majority opinion claimed the plaintiff’s arguments were based on a
misconception that this was a custody dispute rather than a contract dispute and since the case was
being remanded to the trial court for further proceedings the Appellate Court was not going to
address the remainder of the plaintiff’s claim.440
The Michigan Supreme Court denied the appeal. J. McCormick wrote a concurring opinion
that the fact intensive questions should be decided by the trial court including whether contract

434

Id. at *14.
Id. at *8-9.
436
Id. at *9.
437
Id. at *3.
438
Id. at *4.
439
Id. at *2-3.
440
Id. at *3.
435

86

law applies, and also stated the trial court should not avoid the question argued by the parties
whether frozen embryos are persons subject to a custody determination.
V.

CONCLUSION

When deciding cases involving disposition of cryopreserved or “frozen” embryos,
courts continue to rely on precedent based on dicta and erroneous scientific concepts, particularly
those expressed in Davis v. Davis and its progeny. Courts also continue to mislabel human
organisms, existing human beings, as “pre-embryos” with the potential for life as opposed to
correctly defining them as human life with full potential to complete all of life’s stages from
conception until death and totally ignoring or disregarding the fact that the term “pre-embryo” is
unacceptable in the scientific community. The courts classify the “frozen” “pre-embryos” as a
form of marital property of a “special character” or “special respect” or entities to be disposed of
according to clinic consent forms describing the embryos as property, without considering the
basic human rights and interests or the constitutional rights and interests of the human
organisms, human beings under the Thirteenth Amendment. Further, they refuse to recognize
that once the progenitors have procreated human organisms, human life was created, and
procreation rights were already exercised as to those particular human organisms, identifiable
human beings. Accordingly, the right not to procreate does not exist as to those already created
human organisms, existing human beings.
The time has come for courts to determine the fate of cryopreserved embryos based on
the scientific truth that they are human organisms, existing human life, entitled to basic human
rights and the full panoply of constitutional rights under the Thirteenth Amendment, not some
form of property, that they are not mere human tissue with only a potential for life, and that once
the progenitors have procreated particular human lives no right not to procreate can exist as to
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those existing created human organisms.
The government’s duty is to secure and protect unalienable rights. Parental rights include
the right to conceive and raise one’s offspring. Thus, “[t]he rights to conceive and to raise one’s
children have been deemed ‘essential,’ ‘basic civil rights of man’, and ‘rights far more precious .
. . than property rights.”441
The duty of justice, through the courts, is to properly identify who the subjects are that
seek governmental protection, and to secure rights and interests of the subject before it, and to
correctly name the rights and interests on the scale of justice in any embryo dispute.442 What
needs to be weighed in disputes over human embryos’ fate are human rights and not property
rights.
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